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Abstract 
The concentration of global wealth, power, knowledge, authority and prestige continues unabated. 
Antitrust enforcement has been at the heart of debates on combating increasing inequality. Yet, the 
transformation possibilities have been overstated, while its impact has been paralyzed by widespread 
assumptions about both antitrust and international trade analysis. Challenging "market power" or 
"capital accumulation", as per Thomas Piketty's analysis, may contribute to the reproduction of 
concentration of power. This article cautions about the viability of the current antitrust and 
international trade assumptions and doctrines to tackle the challenges of growth and injustice of 
today’s globalized society.  
It argues that the hierarchical structure of production in goods, services, knowledge, and prestige in 
global society should be the starting point of legal and economic analysis. Lawyers should articulate 
targeted resistance to particular hierarchies using antitrust and trade law as updated tools. As an 
example of this analysis, this article describes a privilege to harm, enjoyed by companies from the 
structural center of Europe against firms on the periphery. This privilege is termed: dumping by the 
center. This analysis provides one explanation for the increasing wealth and power in the center of the 
European Union, despite the Union's promise of development for all. While developing this doctrine, 
several assumptions of antitrust and trade law are challenged, including the coherence of the consumer 
welfare standard, the benefits of low prices and the assumption that non-predatory dumping on the 
internal market is not possible. 
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 1 
Introduction1 
Antitrust enforcement appears to be confronted with a paradox. The divergence in wealth distribution 
is occurring on a national and global scale. There is growing inequality in the world and, particularly 
in the United States, there is a resentment about the concentration of income and economic power in 
the hands of the one-percent.
2
 President Obama has made reducing wealth inequality the signature 
issue of his second term
3
 and the topic is shaping up as a potentially defining focal point for the 2016 
Presidential election.
4
 
The U.S. economy has begun to recover from the Great Recession since mid-2009, but the rising tide 
has not lifted all boats. To the contrary, median income and wealth both declined in real terms 
between 2010 and 2013.
5
 Over essentially the same period, the real income of the top 1% grew by 
31.4%.
6
 Yet, there has been political malaise about antitrust enforcement in the United States
7
, the 
purpose of which is also to counter the concentration of power and wealth in society.
8 
   
Several authors have called on antitrust policy to play its role in the combat of inequality in the world. 
Joseph Stiglitz has called for “stronger and more effectively enforced competition laws” to help 
                                                     
1 The author would like to thank Duncan Kennedy, Gráinne de Búrca, Mark Tushnet, Lewis Sargentich, Roberto Unger, Oren 
Bar-Gill, Einer R. Elhauge, William Alford, Martti Koskenniemi, Joanne Scott, Giorgio Monti, Catherine MacKinnon, 
David Wilkins, Lucy White, Samuli Sepännen, Jan Fiala, Peter Gordon, Horatia Muir Watt, Miguel Maduro, Mark Wu, 
Daniela Caruso, Dimitry Kochenov and Peter Lindseth for their comments, critiques, and advice. The original version of 
this thinking was presented as “Whose Social Europe?” at the conference “Developing Europe: Regional Policy and Free 
Markets in European Legal Discourse” at Harvard Law School on April 16. 2010 and at the conference “The European 
Legal Project: New Approaches” at Harvard Law School on April 13, 2012. It also reflects the author’s unpublished 
manuscript on hold with Duncan Kennedy, David Kennedy, Gráinne de Búrca and Daniela Caruso, (December 26. 2012) 
and his doctoral dissertation “Hierarchies as Law” (Harvard Law School, Winter 2014/2015). Several versions of this 
work were presented at conferences and workshops at Vienna Law School in May 2011, at Harvard Law School in April 
2010, in June 2013 in December 2014 and March 2015, at Yale Law School in December 2012, at Oxford University in 
May 2013 and at London School of Economics in June 2015. The author would like to thank the participants of these 
conferences and workshops for their critiques, comments, and advice. The opinions expressed in this article are solely the 
views of the author. 
2 J.M.F. and A.C.M., The Purse of The One Percent, Economist (2014), available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/ 
graphicdetail/2014/10/daily-chart-8 
3 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2015), available at 
 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015; 
Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility, (Dec. 4, 2013), available at 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-presidenteconomic-mobility. 
4 See, e.g.¸David Lauter, Income inequality emerges as key issue in 2016 presidential campaign, L.A. Times (Feb. 5, 
2015), available at http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-campaign-income-20150205story.html#page=1; Joseph Stigliz: 
Inequality a “key issue” for US election 2016, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32459519. 
5 Jonathan B. Baker and Steven S. Salop Antitrust, Competition Policy and Inequality, available at 
(http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/BakerSalop-AntitrustCompetitionPolicyandInequality2.pdf) citing 
Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962–2013: What Happened Over the Great 
Recession? 49 tbl.1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20733) (2014). 
6 Updated Tables and Figures (2013) to Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–
1998, 118 q.j. Econ. 1 (2003), available at http://elsa.berkeley. edu/~saez/Tab Fig2012prel.xls (last visited Mar. 18, 
2015). 
7 See generally Jonathan B. Baker and Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 Geo. L.J. 1-28 
(2015). See also Jonathan Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and Future of Antitrust, 81 Fordham 
L. Rev. 2175, 2178 (2013).  
8 See Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (2008); Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and 
Economics (2011). 
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address inequality.
9
 Luigi Zingales has argued that “the most powerful argument for antitrust law” is 
that “it reduces the political power of firms”10 Paul Krugman11 and Anthony Atkinson12 have also 
claimed that monopoly and anticompetitive market conditions are among the root causes of wealth 
inequality. Sandeep Vanessan has argued that consumer-oriented antitrust enforcement can promote 
more progressive wealth distribution
13
 and that the lack of competition in many sectors of the US 
economy is […] a powerful driver of economic disparity.14 
Today’s antitrust law is global antitrust law. While there are important differences between models of 
antitrust in various jurisdictions, these differences no longer have as much to do with different values 
as with different presumptions about how to resolve theoretical or empirical ambiguities raised by a 
common framework of antitrust economics.
15 
Modern antitrust analysis reflects the dominance of the 
economic model of analyzing antitrust policy. Both in the United States and in the European Union 
legal models have embraced an exclusively economic methodology based on maximizing consumer or 
total welfare
16
 and have done so in a way that is common to the diverging political viewpoints in 
several jurisdictions.
17 
I will argue that the tools of global antitrust and international trade law can play a role in social 
transformation and can be systematically used for particular purposes of social transformation, but 
based on three propositions. First, the complex hierarchical structure of production of goods, services, 
knowledge, authority and prestige in global society that gives analytic clarity about its construction
18
 
should be the starting point of legal and economic analysis. Second, lawyers should articulate targeted 
resistance to particular hierarchical structures rather than pursue abstract goals of equality or 
competition. Third, in order to articulate new tools for addressing the reproduction of wealth and 
power in society, some of the assumptions of global antitrust and trade law need rethinking and 
amending. 
To support these three propositions, this article addresses and challenges some of the assumptions of 
the common framework of antitrust and trade legal and economic analysis.
19  
There is an ongoing 
debate in the antitrust literature on the proper goal of antitrust analysis. Some argue that consumer 
                                                     
9    Joseph e. Stiglitz, The price of inequality: how today’s divided society endangers our future 40 (2012). 
10 Luigi Zingales, A Capitalism for the People: Recapturing the Lost Genious of American prosperity (2012). 
11 Paul Krugman, Robots and Robber Barons (2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/opinion/krugman-
robots-and-robber-barons.html?_r=0. 
12 Anhony B. Atkinson, Inequality: What can be done? 126-127 (2015).  
13    Sandeep Vanesaan, The Evolving Populisms of Antitrust, 93 Neb. L. Rev. 370, 413 (2014). 
14 Lina Khan and Sandeep Vaheesan, How America Became Uncompetitive and Unequal, The Washington Post (June 13 
2014).  
15 Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 7, at v. See generally, Lawrence Sullivan, William Fikentscher, On the Growth of the 
Antitrust Idea, 17 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 197 (1998). 
16 Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and future of Antitrust, 81 Fordham L. J. 2175, 
2178 (2013).   
17 See Elhauge and Geradin, supra note 7, at v.  
18 See Damjan Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, 21.1. Colum J Eur L. (2014) and Damjan Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, 
unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, on file with Harvard Law School library (Winter 2014/15).  
19 The term antitrust will be used broadly throughout the article. Antitrust is an ambiguous term, especially in an 
international setting. It refers to a competition policy dealing with business structure and conduct and, more broadly, with 
the appropriate role of business in modem life. See Lawrence Sullivan, William Fikentscher, On the Growth of the 
Antitrust Idea, 17 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 197 (1998), available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?/article=1414 
&context=bjil. 
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welfare should guide antitrust decision-making, others favor the total welfare standard.
20
 However, 
analysis based on the relationship between abstract consumers and abstract producers (the consumer 
and total welfare standards) fails to account for the fact that consumers and producers find themselves 
in diverse situations in the global production of goods, services, knowledge and prestige, that they are 
positioned differently in the global value chains
21
 and that both the consumer and total welfare 
standards mistakenly assume the universal benefit of low prices.  
Furthermore, today’s economic methodology of global antitrust is met with arguments of equity or 
fairness. This interplay of fairness and welfare also structures the debate in international economic 
law, as reflected in a plethora of “Trade and __” analyses.22 The interplay of abstract efficiency and 
fairness considerations, however, can restrict opportunities of restructuring antitrust policy and 
resistance to the reproduction of the concentration of power in global society. There are several ways 
of structuring competition on the merits and the existing legal structure reflects a particular 
understanding of social cost rather than any essential maximization of welfare.
23
 Similarly, there are 
several ways of structuring equity or justice and there is no guarantee that existing perceptions of 
justice would not contribute to the reproduction of existing hierarchies.
24
 A preference for either free 
competition or for justice does not in itself explain how the existing hierarchical structure of society 
and the concentration of wealth, power, authority and prestige will be affected. Unjust reality can be 
constructed by economic theories and claims as well as by theories and claims of justice. Rather than 
interplay of economic and equitable considerations, the starting point of legal and economic analysis 
should be the hierarchical structure of society. An analytical approach that challenges the existing 
concentration of wealth in the world must address the privileges to harm that are allocated differently 
to different people in the global hierarchical structure. This disparity of the global allocation of 
privileges to harm may pose a more important barrier to trade for those in hierarchically unprivileged 
situations than national borders and the related obstacles to trade that fundamentally inform the 
international economic and legal analysis. From this, I will argue that the assumption of legal and 
economic theory that non-predatory dumping is not possible on the internal market is incorrect. It will 
also be argued that pricing equalization does not occur due to free market forces unleashed by the end 
of border controls and of related measures nor due to the prohibition of exclusive vertical agreements. 
The main context of my inquiry will be the European Union internal market, although the implications 
are worldwide.  
This article has several aims. First, the aim is to show the continuing importance and relevance of 
antitrust and international trade lawyers in countering the concentration of power in the hands of the 
few or in some geographic areas of the world, if some of the assumptions of antitrust and trade are 
adjusted. Second, the goal is to articulate a particular analysis from the perspective of the (European) 
periphery. As the recent Euro crises and the near exit of Greece from the Union show, the European 
prospect of development for all has not arrived. This article will articulate the privilege of the 
corporations in a structurally privileged position of the European center to harm the industry of the 
                                                     
20   Alan J. Meese, Symposium: The goals of antitrust: Reframing the (false?) Choice between purchaser welfare and total 
welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2197 (2013), John B. Kirkwood, The Goals Of Antitrust: The Essence Of Antitrust: 
Protecting Consumers And Small Suppliers From Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2425 (2013), Maurice E. 
Stucke, Reconsidering antitrust's goals, 53 B.C. L. REV 551, John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental 
Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 191, 208 (2008), Russell 
Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement, Competition Pol'y Int'l (2007), 
Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?, J. Econ. Persp (2007). 
21   Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey, and Timothy Sturgeon, The governance of global value chains, 1.12 R. Int’l. Pol. Econ. 78 
(2005).  
22 See e.g. Joel Trachtman, Transcending “Trade and . . .”–an Institutional Perspective, 96 American J. Int’l. L.  77 (2002). 
23 Duncan Kennedy Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stanford L. Rev. 387 (1981).  
24 Damjan Kukovec, Taking Change Seriously: The Rhetoric of Justice and the Reproduction of the Status Quo in Europe’s 
Justice Deficit? 319 (2015). 
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periphery and offers one analysis and explanation for the reproduction of hierarchies and 
concentration of wealth in the center of the European Union. The doctrine developed on this basis is 
called “dumping practices of the center”. Third, the aim is to challenge the sensibility that economic 
thinking is the main culprit in the concentration of power and economic impoverishment of some parts 
or sections of the world. Rather, what needs to be challenged is the existing social understanding of 
injury, in economic thinking just as much as in thinking about equity or fairness. In arguing for a 
reversal of social understanding of harm, economic analysis can be used as an important tool for social 
transformation.  
Section I. addresses the current debate on combating inequality through antitrust law. The assumptions 
of the discussion do not serve transformative possibilities and I advocate for a targeted resistance to 
the existing hierarchical structure of society with adjusted tools of antitrust and trade law. Section II. 
sets out a specific macro hierarchical structure – the center-periphery relationship in the European 
Union. Price differences form a basis for dumping practices on the EU internal market that contribute 
to the concentration of power, wealth, authority and prestige in the center of the European Union. 
Section III. sets out the rationale for dumping in international trade. Section IV. further explains the 
doctrine “dumping practices of the European center” and challenges some assumptions of antitrust and 
trade law. Section V. explores the general arguments against the doctrine of dumping and further 
challenges the idea of benefit of low prices. Section VI. questions the idea of “competition on the 
merits” on the EU internal market.  
Antitrust as a tool for combating inequality 
Resisting market power 
In his recent book Inequality: What Can Be Done?, British economist Anthony Atkinson argues, that 
the United States has erred in shifting away from the Sherman Act’s original focus on wealth 
inequality to a pure consumer welfare orientation for antitrust law.
25
 Paul Krugman argues that 
“increasing business concentration could be an important factor in stagnating demand for labor, as 
corporations use their growing monopoly power to raise prices without passing the gains on to their 
employees.”26 
Jonathan Baker and Steven Salop argue that while it is not possible to identify with precision the 
relative magnitudes of various factors contributing to growing inequality, market power likely has an 
effect. Relying on Thomas Piketty's analysis, they argue that because the exercise of market power 
tends to raise the return to capital, it can contribute to the development and perpetuation of inequality. 
As market power grows more common and visible, an increasing public concern with inequality might 
be expected to call for a competition policy response.
27
 
Baker and Salop set forth a range of possible antitrust policy adjustments that might be considered in 
response to market power, or inequality more general.
28
 Concerns with inequality can implicate 
antitrust and competition policy in two general ways. First, in that market power contributes to 
inequality, more aggressive antitrust enforcement might play a remedial role. Second, antitrust 
                                                     
25 Anthony B. Atkinson, Inequality: What can be done? 126-127 (2015). 
26 Paul Krugman, Robots and Robber Barons (2012), available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/opinion/krugman-
robots-and-robber-barons.html?_r=0. 
27 Jonathan B. Baker and Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 Geo. L.J. 1-28 (2015).  
28 Id. at 11. 
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regulatory agencies might make reducing the effects of inequality a higher priority in developing 
enforcement and regulatory initiatives.
29
  
Baker and Salop argue that greater antitrust enforcement generally would improve the distribution of 
income and wealth by reducing the impact of market power, particularly if the agencies fully embrace 
the consumer welfare standard.
30 
The reason is that this standard does not permit conduct that would 
harm consumers while benefiting shareholders. In contrast, the aggregate welfare standard can 
contribute to inequality by permitting conduct that leads to the creation and exercise of market power, 
if there are also cost savings or other efficiencies associated with the conduct and they are not shared 
with buyers. Under those circumstances, market power increases producer surplus that accrues 
primarily to shareholders and top executives, who typically are wealthier than the consumers of the 
products.
31
 
Growing concern about inequality, according to Baker and Salop, that lead to the recognition of 
additional harms from market power in turn would justify reconsideration of that direction in favor of 
adopting more interventionist antitrust rules that would recognize greater harm from market power 
than had previously been identified.
32
  
In this analysis, resistance to inequality translates into almost indiscriminate resistance to "market 
power", without an account as to how and why precisely accumulation of capital, wealth and power 
occurs and who gains from it. Furthermore, reliance on protectionist considerations and equality in 
general does not assure change for the benefit of those who find themselves in structurally 
unprivileged positions in society.
33
 Finding a systemic legal regime that will favor the weaker party, 
such as the class of consumers is fraught with analytical difficulties. Postulating an abstraction of a 
“weaker party” as the underlying reality of the world and aiming to help this presumably preexisting 
category can lead to reproduction of several hierarchical structures.
34
 The danger of challenging 
market power in the abstract, as in Baker and Salop's proposal, without adequately addressing the 
complexity of the hierarchical structure of society and without developing a clearer analytical picture 
of concentration and reproduction of power in society leads to a discussion at a purely conceptual level 
without ever raising the necessary appreciation of the economic, social, and ethical issues which the 
work of lawyers should engage in the pursuit of advocacy for the most vulnerable. Consequently, such 
reasoning may well contribute to the reproduction of the existing distribution of material and spiritual 
values in the world.
35
 
The analytical weakness of Baker's and Salop's proposal is confirmed by Daniel Crane's distributional 
analysis. He argues that it is far from certain that antitrust violations (including cartels, anticompetitive 
mergers, and abuses of dominance) systematically redirect wealth from the poor to the rich. In order to 
sustain a showing that they do, one would have to have information about a large number of factors, 
including the relative wealth of producers and consumers, overcharge pass-on rates, the effects of 
                                                     
29 Id. at 11.  
30 Id. at 14.   
31 Id. at 13. They do argue that application of a consumer welfare standard in principle could increase inequality in matters 
where consumers tend to be wealthy and the sellers are small firms owned by middle class entrepreneurs, such as 
hypothetical cartels among worker-owned manufacturers of luxury goods, such as fine crystal products or yachts. 
However, they expect those situations are rare. Id. at 13-14.  
32 Id. at 15-16. 
33 Damjan Kukovec, Taking Changes Seriously: The Rhetoric of Justice and the Reproduction of the Status Quo in 
Europe’s Justice Deficit? 319, 324-330 (2015). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. Justice is often understood within a particular framework of interpretation which contributes to reaffirmation of 
existing perceptions of social injury rather than challenging them. Universalized efficiency v universalized equity 
analysis in Laval – the plight of the workers of the periphery was persistently overlooked.  
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market power on employees of the firm, the distribution of rents as between managers and 
shareholders and the distribution of rents among classes of managers.
36
 
The assumption underlying the progressive claim of antitrust enforcement is that senior managers and 
wealthy shareholders of large companies capture the majority of the rents attributable to 
anticompetitive conduct, and hence outpacing the typical consumer in the accumulation of wealth. In 
this picture, relatively poorer consumers bear the brunt of monopoly overcharges.
37
 But it is far from 
certain that CEOs and rich shareholders are in fact capturing the lions’ share of monopoly profits.38 
Monopoly rents are not captured uniformly by the owners of capital (i.e. shareholders) but are 
distributed in various complex ways throughout the firm, including its workers.
39
 The monopoly labor 
wage premium has been observed across a variety of industries.
40
 Blue collar workers may be able to 
extract significant monopoly rents from their employers, thus counterbalancing any regressive effects 
caused by shareholder or senior management rent extraction.  
The idea that monopoly rents end up solely in the hands of the wealthy executives resonates with the 
widely held assumption in the European legal discourse that the award of the government procurement 
contract to a peripheral company offering the lowest price, also due to the fact of cheaper labor in the 
European periphery, benefits only the capitalist class of the periphery but not workers or other 
interests beyond the boundaries of the firm.
41
 A conclusion that an increase in market power of a 
particular company, either by monopolization or an award of a procurement contract based on low 
price, does not have positive consequences beyond management and shareholders cannot simply be 
drawn. Nor can a simple conclusion be drawn that combating abstract market power with existing 
tools of antitrust law will lead to reductions of inequality. A broad challenge to "market power" 
assumes an inaccurate picture of concentration of wealth and power in society and thus gives 
insufficient guidance for addressing it. 
Antitrust as a field of competition but not distribution 
Crane argues that there are so many unknowables in antitrust enforcement that antitrust law is not 
suitable for addressing wealth inequality. In order to draw any firm conclusions regarding the net 
                                                     
36 Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 Cornell L. Rev. (2015 forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2648541. Despite some the merits of Crane's distributional analysis, 
it should not be accepted at face value. For example, Crane's analysis and conclusion as to the progressive effects of 
monopoly overcharges in government procurement contracts regime is inaccurate. He assumes that wealthier consumers 
pay more for monopoly overcharges, because they pay higher taxes due to progressive taxation. Thus, he concludes, anti-
competitive behavior has progressive effects. He does not, however, take into consideration the fact that poorer 
consumers and citizens may often be the larger recipients from budget transfers and thus carry the cost of monopoly 
overcharges by the fact that less services, goods or funds are available to them due to the higher prices of goods and 
services paid by public authorities because of monopoly overcharges. See Crane at 29-32.   
37 Id. at 14.  
38 Id. at 16.  
39 Id. at 18 citing Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial  Organization, 149 U. Pa L. 
Rev. 2063, 2068 (2001).  
40 Maria Guadalupe, Product Market Competition, Returns to Skill, and Wage Inequality, J. Labor Econ. 439 (2007) 
(surveying literature); David Card, The Impact of Deregulation on the Employment and Wages of Airline Mechanics, 4 
Indus. and Labor Rev. 39 (1986); Ana L. Revegna, Exporting Jobs? The Impact of Import Competition on Employment 
and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing, 1. Q. J. Econ. 107 (1992); George J. Borjas & Valerie A. Ramey, Foreign 
Competition, Market Power, and Wage Inequality, 4 Q. J. Econ. 110 (1995).   
41   See e.g. C. Joerges, Re-conceptualising European Law as Conflicts Law, the ECJ's Labour Law Jurisprudence and 
Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, in Interdisciplinary Studies of Comparative and Private International Law (Vol. 
I) (Jan Sramek Verlag, 2010) 718. See also Damjan Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, 21(3) EUR. L. J. 406 (2015); and 
infra section II. A. Somek, From Workers to Migrants, from Distributive Justice to Inclusion: Exploring the Changing 
Social Democratic Imagination, (2012) 18 (5) EUR. L. J. 711, 721.  
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effect on wealth distribution of market power exercises and antitrust enforcement, one would need to 
prove the relative magnitudes of the cross-cutting effects. That is a task that, Crane claims, to his 
knowledge, has never been undertaken and “could not likely be done with anything approaching 
statistical rigor”.42  
By contrast, Crane claims, the antitrust system is reasonably competent at generating consumer 
welfare and economic efficiency, at creating a larger pie.
43
 Crane sets out that Sherman Act rests on 
the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of 
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at 
the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of democratic political and 
social institutions.
44
  
According to Daniel Crane, antitrust causes essentially two economic effects. First, it eliminates 
deadweight losses that arise from monopoly pricing and hence grows the social welfare pie. 
Elimination of deadweight loss is asserted not to have any direct distributive effects.
45
 Second, 
antitrust enforcement prevents redistribution of wealth from consumers to producers.
46
 Thus, Crane 
concludes, antitrust law works best as a set of objective principles regarding “measurable economic 
effects” in commercial markets.47  
It remains unclear, however, what these measurable economic effects are, if effects of antitrust policy 
are so difficult to predict, as Crane’s analysis suggests.48 If "the net effect on wealth distribution from 
general increases or decreases in overall antitrust enforcement is virtually impossible to tell,"
49
 how 
can a conclusion be drawn that existing antitrust law based on existing economic assumptions 
maximizes consumer welfare and generates a larger pie than its alternative construction?  
As Ronald Coase argued, the goal of legal and economic analysis should be to choose the solution that 
yields the least costs. However, Coase claimed, that cannot be achieved on the basis of theory. Instead, 
it “has to come from a detailed investigation of the actual results of handling the problem in different 
ways.”50 If the detailed investigation of the actual results, could not likely be done with anything 
approaching statistical rigor, then “measurable economic effects”, consumer welfare or total welfare, 
are just as uncertain as the distribution of wealth. In other words, calculation of the sum of individual 
welfare runs into the same difficulty and uncertainty as calculation of wealth distribution as Crane 
portrays.  
The effects of antitrust enforcement seem coherent when its goal is framed in terms of aiming at 
“competition” or at elimination of the deadweight loss. It is assumed that some competitors win on the 
market by being the most innovative, the most responsive to consumer’s wishes, and by producing 
goods or services in the most efficient way possible. It would thus be strange, and, indeed harmful, if 
that firm could then be condemned for being a monopolist.
51
 However, competition, just as the 
calculation of individual welfare, itself can be structured in several different ways. 
                                                     
42 Crane, supra note 35, at 38.  
43 Crane, supra note 35, at 6 n.12. 
44 N Pac Ry Co v US 356 US 1, 4 (1958). 
45 Crane, supra note 35, at 6. 
46 Crane, supra note 35, at 6. 
47 Crane, supra note 35, at 59. 
48 Id.. 
49 Crane, supra note 35, at 4.  
50 Robert H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
51 As judge Learned Hand opined in US v Aluminum Co of America: [A] single producer may be the survivor out of a 
group of active companies, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry[… ]. The successful competitor, 
having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins. 148 F 2d 416 (2nd Cir 1945).  
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Kaplow and Shavell argue that "as a practical matter it will rarely if ever be the case that one of two 
policies under serious consideration will literally make everyone better off than the other."
52
 The 
outcome of the standard of consumer or total welfare or consumer welfare indeed depends on the 
initial valuations.
53
 The argument that will win the claim of maximization of global welfare will be a 
result of a decision
54
, and cannot be based on an abstract formula of consumer welfare defined as the 
excess of social valuation of product over the price actually paid or on total welfare that combines 
consumer and producer benefits.
55
  
Despite the acknowledgment of various possibilities for welfare maximization scholars often reverse 
to abstract reasoning in terms of maximization of production and consumption. For example, as I 
further explore in section V., it is assumed in international trade that provided that the firm is pricing 
above its average variable costs, its behavior should not be considered problematic, and according to 
economic theory, no remedy is necessary.
56
  
However, economic thinking should be understood as a tool for social transformation, not a repository 
of ready-made solutions that could serve as normative guides and a substitute for a detailed 
investigation of the actual results. One thus cannot conclude, as Crane does, that antitrust is good at 
producing competition and consumer welfare, but cannot be used for distributive purposes. Rather, the 
conclusion is that both claims that antitrust law, as currently conceived, produces competition and 
maximizes welfare or that it produces social equality rest on uncertain and incoherent assumptions. 
Antitrust as an inadequate tool for addressing inequality – 
Preference for tax and transfer 
Nor could we follow Crane’s conclusion that as a matter of comparative institutional advantage, the 
antitrust system is far inferior to other branches of law and governmental authority in addressing 
wealth equality and that therefore distribution should only be addressed through tax and transfer.
57
  
Crane’s conclusion is based on the argument that the legal system is generally inferior to the income 
tax and transfer system in the redistribution of wealth.
58
 According to Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell, competition law is a weak mechanism for achieving distributive outcomes since it is poorly 
targeted, particularly in comparison to a tax and transfer system. In contrast, a tax and transfer system 
can be designed to both target post-transfer equality, while being feasible.
59
  
                                                     
52 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law, 
Economics and Business, Discussion Paper No. 251, 72-74 (1999), see Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness 
versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, J. Legal Stud. 32 (2003), at 55-58  
“any factor that influences individuals’ well-being is relevant under welfare economics, and a taste for fairness is no 
different in this respect from a taste for a tangible good or for anything else”. 
53 See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 387 (1981) Palgrave 
Dictionary. Stanford Law Review and  Law and Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, 2 The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 465 (P. Newman, ed., Macmillan, New York, 1998). 
54 Id.  
55 See infra section IV. 
56 See Mark Wu, infra section IV. and V.  
57 Crane, supra note 35, at 56. 
58 Crane, supra note 35, at 56. 
59 Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 51, at 72. 
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Thinking in terms of taxation and redistribution through the budget, however, misses (and obscures) 
questions of both distribution and development.
60
 It misses the essential point of legal analysis. 
Identification of structural injury is important even if redistribution through the tax system is found to 
be more efficient than the legal system.  
As will be argued in section II., companies of the European center have a legally sanctioned privilege 
to harm companies of the periphery. Companies on the periphery cannot be compensated for this 
injury through the tax and transfer system because of EU state aid rules, which prevent any company 
from receiving government support since that support provides an advantage over its competitors.
61
 In 
other words, if unjust injury is not articulated and not acknowledged, it cannot be determined who 
should be compensated either through the legal system or through tax and transfer.  
In fact, the suggestion for redistribution through the budget is untargeted when we do not know who 
needs compensation. Redistribution through taxation could fulfill its goals on the presupposition that 
all the past and future injuries in a society have already been identified and that we thus know how to 
remedy them through the budget transfer. Neither social change through tax and transfer, nor through 
the legal system can be pursued without legal analysis that is not based on imminent meanings of 
competition.  
Crane’s assumptions about antitrust law’s ability to ensure competition, but not distribution, which 
should be left to tax and transfer, bring us to the same conclusion as Thomas Piketty’s analysis of 
fighting inequality – to a conclusion of combating inequality through taxation without an analysis of 
how this redistribution should occur.  
Social processes, including competition and the process of concentration of capital and wealth cannot 
be adequately depicted or addressed by economic theories or formulas.
62
 For example, Thomas 
Piketty's conclusion that a rate of return on capital (r) is greater than economic growth (g), (r˃g), is an 
ex post facto rationalization of the phenomenon of accumulation of capital. Much as the private rate of 
return on capital can be significantly higher for long periods of time than the rate of growth of income 
and output
63,
 this finding does not articulate the reasons for this. It does not articulate the specific 
injuries that could explain the phenomenon of accumulation of capital or of the concentration of 
wealth. It does not give us an analytical perspective of what accumulation of capital we would want to 
resist and what accumulation of capital we would want to honor. It suffers from the same problem of 
under and overinclusion as Baker and Salop’s proposal of resisting the concentration of “market 
power”. Resistance to “accumulation of capital”, just as resistance to “capitalism”64, is thus unable to 
address structural injury that would allow reversing the repetitive structural injuries of the 
hierarchically privileged and significantly limits our options for social reimagination.
65
 It is unable to 
articulate resistance to select injuries, but for a general need for increased transfers through taxation.  
To conclude, antitrust and trade legal analysis can serve as a tool of social transformation and of 
resistance to concentration of wealth and power in society. However, neither Crane's nor Baker and 
Salop's analysis appear to serve transformative possibilities. Lawyers need to address the existing 
                                                     
60 D. Kennedy, Law and Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law 465 (1998); Roberto M. Unger, What Should the Left Propose? 149 (2005).  
61 See e.g. Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (2008); Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and 
Economics (2011). 
62 See Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 17, at 165. 
63 Thomas Piketty, Capital In The Twenty - First Century 571 (2014). 
64 Anti-capitalist rhetoric is frequently used as a rhetorical support for one’s political preference without analytical added-
value. See Damjan Kukovec, A Critique of the Rhetoric of Common Interest in the EU Legal Discourse, (13 April 2012) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2178332.  See also Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, 
supra note 40 at 410; and Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 17, at 162.  
65 See Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 40 at 411; and Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 17 at 192.  
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understanding of social cost and welfare maximization in order to open up the range of social 
options.
66
 I will advocate for a targeted re articulation of antitrust and trade analysis and propose a new 
doctrine in the European Union internal market as an example of such analysis. 
Addressing the hierarchical structure 
Despite an appeal to rethinking the current understanding of social cost and wealth maximization, a 
conclusion that economic thinking should be the main target of resistance to the reproduction of 
concentration of wealth would be mistaken. On the contrary, economic thinking can be an important 
element of the challenge to the concentration of power and wealth. 
Today, many ills of society are often ascribed to economic thinking or neoliberalism.
67 
For example, in 
the idea that there is a ubiquitous neoliberal rationality that remakes everything and everyone in the 
image of homo oeconomicus and transposes the constituent elements of democracy into an economic 
register.
68
 However, as any social process, our reality cannot be described solely by economic theory. 
Theories are timeless abstractions, rationalizations that cannot adequately describe reality but as a 
partial ex post facto rationalization. Ideology, however, is constantly fluid and changing, reflecting the 
hierarchies we collectively find just and unjust. It is the ideology of every moment in time that defines 
reality, not a theory.
69
 Thus, resistance to economic theory or economic thinking as such cannot be 
understood as a recipe for challenging the reproduction of power and wealth. The existing hierarchical 
structure of society and ideology, the social understanding of injury that underpins it, need to be 
challenged.
70
 
The starting point of my analysis is that law and governance should be understood as a constant 
hierarchical struggle.
71
 In this struggle, the hierarchically privileged repetitively injure those in a 
structurally subordinate position and these harms perpetuate their hierarchical position.
72
 Hierarchies 
can be managed, reproduced or reconstructed, but they are ineradicable. People have very different 
powers to injure others, depending on where in the global hierarchical structure they find themselves. 
Some harms, however, are perceived as normal. Repetition of countless uncontested injuries 
reproduces the existing hierarchies in society. In order to combat existing reproduction of 
concentration – those injuries and the hierarchical reality need to be identified and new tools and 
doctrines resisting them constructed.
73
  
In the construction of the doctrine of "dumping practices of the European center" in the next section, 
no particular theory of fairness or aiming at restoring a moral balance in the world is professed. A 
preference for equity over welfare or vice versa is not argued. The proposed distributional analysis is 
                                                     
66 Lucie E White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 699 (1988). 
67 See, e.g. Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the 
Social, in David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos eds., The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 203 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Galit A. Sarfaty Values in translation, human rights and the 
culture of the world bank (2012), Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social 
Deficit’ of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval, (2009) 15(1) EUR L. J. 
68 See generally Wendy Brown: Undoing The Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution (2015). For a critique, see 
Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 17, at 137.; Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 40 at 412; and 
Kukovec, Taking Change Seriously, supra note 23 at 325. 
69 For the critique of David Kennedy's synonym between economics and ideology, see Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra 
note 17, at 164.  
70 See id. 
71 See Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 17, at 168. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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based on individual well-being.
74
 It is nonetheless based on the premise that there is no single way to 
maximize societies’ welfare. There are many, depending on the weights attached to the welfare of 
particularly situated individuals, with different distributional consequences.
75
  
The aim of the analysis is articulation of a particular vision of hierarchical subordination. The 
portrayed resistance is not untargeted. Crane correctly argues that there is extreme complexity in 
antitrust analysis
76
, as there is complexity in law in general. But harms are not entirely random, 
repetitive hierarchical structures can be identified and contested.  
There are countless hierarchical structures at play in our societies that contribute to the reproduction of 
wealth, power, knowledge and prestige in the world. I will address a particular macro hierarchical 
structure of society, the center-periphery relationship in the European Union in order to portray an 
example of the type of antitrust and trade analysis that is missed globally.  
The European Union internal market 
The center-periphery perspective 
The common intuition has been that the EU takes in poor countries and turns them into high-income 
countries and that likewise, the interests “of the other” are taken into account in EU legal discourse, 
and that all nations are in control of the larger processes of the Union.  
However, my own intuition has been that the interests and concerns of the new peripheral Member 
countries were difficult to express in the existing legal discourse and that this crucially influences their 
position in the EU. The current Euro crisis simply brought to the fore a larger and hitherto invisible 
structural problem as to the relationship between the European Union's center and its periphery.
77
 
What is the center and what the periphery of the European Union? The center countries or regions are 
those with a much higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita than the regions of the periphery. 
They invest more money in research and development and have the best universities. They have more 
capital and more ingoing and outgoing foreign direct investment (FDI). Their actors, products and 
services have more prestige. Internationally recognized brands come from the center, which give their 
owners significant market power. Branded firms enjoy higher margins and more loyal customers, who 
will also not switch to another brand despite a price increase.
78
 The center exports final products and is 
the seat of powerful corporations and law firms. Countries of the center include Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom. 
The periphery has a much weaker industrial sector and a less efficient agricultural sector. It has very 
few brands known beyond its borders. Non-branded companies typically earn lower margins and are 
constantly at risk of being undercut by cheaper rivals.
79
 Some of the few famous brands of Eastern 
                                                     
74 Hence no weight should be accorded to independent notions of fairness, other than many purely distributive notions. See 
Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice (2002). 
75 Duncan Kennedy, supra note 52, at 389.  
76 Crane, supra note 35, at 55.  
77 See also Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 17, at 134; and Damjan Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law (SJD 
dissertation, Winter 2014).   
78 Non-branded companies typically earn gross margins of 3–8 percent and are constantly at risk of being undercut by 
cheaper rivals. Branded firms enjoy fatter margins (15 percent or higher) and more loyal customers. See Brand New: 
Emerging-Market Companies Are Trying to Build Global Brands, Economist (Aug. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21559894.  
79 Branded firms enjoy fatter margins (15 percent or higher) and more loyal customers. See id. 
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Europe have in fact been bought by established companies of the center.
80
 Regions of the periphery 
have a lower GDP per capita, and the actors, products, and services from the periphery have much less 
prestige. They often produce semi-final products or final products for a brand of the center. The wages 
are lower than in the center, and often (with the exception of the European south) the life expectancy 
is lower. Countries of the periphery include Hungary, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Poland, Slovenia, and Estonia.
81 
 
The legal discourse discussion in the European Union, as the legal discourse globally, is caught up in 
the universalized debate in terms of efficiency and equity, in the interplay between individualist and 
protectionist considerations. But this leaves the hierarchical structure of society and the privileges of 
some to harm others untouched.  
Once the European legal structure is seen as a plethora of hierarchies among people with particular 
freedoms and prohibitions
82, the picture of the EU’s legal structure appears quite different from the 
imagination of a system seeking a just balance between social and free movement considerations.
83 
In 
this new picture, the EU center’s views concerning free movement and social considerations are 
strong, and are conceived of as natural or less problematic, whereas the periphery’s claims are often 
perceived as harmful.
84
  
Social justice is frequently addressed from the perspective of the European center.
85
 The discussion 
ensuing from the Laval
86
 and Viking
87 
judgments of the European Court of Justice highlighted the 
problem of "social dumping" in the European Union. Social dumping is usually understood as usage of 
cheaper labor in cross-border activity and it was generally prohibited by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in the Laval case.
88 
 
Laval, a Latvian construction company, was hired through government procurement on public works 
contract in Sweden. (Note that Sweden is a country of the center and Latvia a country of the 
periphery.) Laval paid its Latvian workers significantly less than Swedish workers typically would 
receive for similar construction jobs, making the Latvian company more competitive in this respect. A 
                                                     
80 For example, the Czech car company Škoda was bought by the Volkswagen group, which is seen as a success story. See, 
e.g., IBS Ctr. Mgmt. Research, Volkswagen's Acquisition of Skoda Auto: A Central European Success Story (2007), 
available at http://www.icmrindia.org/casestudies/catalogue/Business%20Strategy/BSTR262.htm.  
81 For a more detailed center-periphery analysis see Damjan Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, 21(3) EUR. L. J. 406 (2015); 
82 Instead, the legal system could be understood as interplay of injuries and recognitions, See Kukovec, supra note 17 at 181. 
83 For the idea of the balance of autonomy and protectionist considerations in EU law, see for instance Miguel Poiares 
Maduro, Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and Social Rights in the EU in The EU And Human 
Rights 450–472 (Philip Alston ed., 1999). 
84 See Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 40, at 413. 
85 For a more in-depth discussion of the justice within a particular framework of interpretation, see Kukovec, Taking Change 
Seriously, supra note 23 at 9.   
86 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbudet [2007] ECR I-11767. For a very similar 
factual situation see also Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989.  
87 The plaintiff Viking, a Finnish shipping company with an Estonian subsidiary, were involved in a legal action against 
union activities. Viking is a ferry operator, operating a ferry between Helsinki in Finland and Tallin, Estonia. The ferry 
was registered in Finland with a predominantly Finnish crew working under Finnish labour standards. The ferry was not 
making sufficient profit, so Viking decided to reflag the ferry in Estonia and replace the Finnish crew with Estonian crew 
working under Estonian labour law, which would be far less expensive. Both the Finnish and Estonian seafarers’ unions 
were members of the international union, which fought against the “flag of convenience” policy and attempted to defend 
seafarers against low wage strategies. The international union advised its members not to enter into collective 
negotiations with Viking and the Estonian union complied, which effectively prevented Viking from reflagging its ship in 
Estonia. Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers Federation, Finnish Seaman’s Union v. Viking Line, [2007] 
ECR I-10779. 
88 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbudet [2007] ECR I-11767. For a very similar 
factual situation see also Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989.  
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Swedish trade union took industrial action against the Latvian company, because the latter refused to 
negotiate over wages for its Latvian workers. The Swedish union’s blockade effectively forced Laval 
out of this business. Laval sued the Swedish union in a Swedish court, which asked the ECJ for an 
interpretation of EU law on the subject.  
The ECJ concluded that under the facts before it, the trade union had violated Laval’s freedom of 
movement of services. However, crucially, the ECJ also strongly condemned social dumping – the use 
of lower labor standards to undercut competition.  
The ECJ’s holding in this particular case depended on the fact that Sweden had not set a minimum 
wage by law or by some generally applicable collective agreement. This effectively narrowed the 
scope of peripheral workers’ freedom of movement to a set of specific and exceptional circumstances, 
which a state like Sweden could change relatively easily.  
The Laval judgment represented just a small win for the periphery. But it caused an unprecedented 
uproar in legal academia, the media, among social scientists and the general public, and so on.
89
 The 
legal profession reacted fiercely to the judgment and rejected "economic" arguments of the periphery, 
such as the argument of comparative advantage of cheaper labor.
90
 The legal profession particularly 
rejected social dumping, and the practice was also condemned by the European Court of Justice. 
Social dumping, from which the European periphery could generally benefit,
91
 is thus prohibited in the 
European Union.  
It will be argued, however, that goods and services dumping by the European center, on the other 
hand, is a widespread, EU-law sanctioned business strategy that can be used by center businesses that 
goes unchallenged by EU competition rules.  
Price difference as a basis for dumping practices of the European center 
There is no condemnation of internal dumping practices in European Union law, despite the fact these 
practices have had a significant potential to harm peripheral industry. Producers in the periphery have 
complained about the extremely low pricing practices by companies of the center. For example, 
Slovenian producers have complained about the abnormally low prices of pork meat by Austrian 
producers, which significantly damage the Slovenian pork industry.
92
 Likewise, Slovenian companies 
have complained about the very low prices that Austrian construction companies are able to offer on 
Slovenian markets to compete for works contracts in government procurement procedures.
93 
 
These concerns will now be addressed. Companies of the center today, on the internal market, have a 
particular, select, legally sanctioned privilege to harm companies of the periphery that is allowed 
under the current interpretation of the free movement of goods and services and antitrust laws. The 
European Union vigorously fights goods dumping from outside of the Union.
94
 Yet EU legal rhetoric 
                                                     
89 For a sample of reactions, see Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 40 at 411. 
90 See e.g. Alexander Somek, From Workers to Migrants, from Distributive Justice to Inclusion: Exploring the Changing 
Social Democratic Imagination, 18 (5) EUR. L. J. 715 (2012). For a detailed discussion how the theory of comparative 
advantage can be used to the benefit of the European periphery, see Damjan Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law (unpublished 
SJD dissertation, on file with the Harvard Law School library, Winter 2014/2015).   
91 See Damjan Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law (SJD dissertation, Winter 2014/2015).   
92 See Tatjana Pihlar, Kmetje: Klavnice se branijo naših prašičev, Dnevnik (May 7, 2012), available at: 
http://www.dnevnik.si/slovenija/v-ospredju/1042527722; Židan poziva Bogoviča k preverjanju morebitnega dampinga 
pri svinjini, Dnevnik (May 3, 2012), available at: http://www.dnevnik.si/clanek/1042527199. 
93 See Nejc Gole, Cveto Pavlin, Strabag postaja močan igralec, a tudi CGP, Delo (February 6, 2013), available at: 
http://www.delo.si/gospodarstvo/podjetja/strabag-postaja-mocan-igralec-a-tudi-cgp.html. 
94 See, for example, antidumping in P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 51 (2002).  
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provides no vocabulary to articulate the problem of goods dumping, either below or above cost, on the 
internal market.  
Companies go to considerable efforts to maintain or gain their market share and use several strategies 
for expansion. Selling goods at different prices in different market segments is one of the most 
common such strategies. Market segmentation involves dividing a broad target market into subsets of 
consumers who have common needs and applications for the relevant goods and services.
95
 Depending 
on the specific characteristics of the product, these subsets may be divided by criteria such as age and 
gender, or other distinctions, like location or income. Marketing campaigns can then be designed and 
implemented to target these specific customer segments. This marketing strategy involves dividing a 
broad target market into subsets of consumers who have common needs and applications for the 
relevant goods and services.
96
 
It is no secret that many goods, not just luxury goods, are generally cheaper in Eastern Europe than in 
Western Europe and cheaper in the periphery than they are at the center of the Union.
97
 The figures 
listed in the tables below shed some light on how market segmentation occurs on the center–periphery 
axis within Europe.  
                                                     
95 See generally Michel Wedel, Wagner A. Kamakura, Market Segmentation: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations 
(2000). 
96 Depending on the specific characteristics of the product, these subsets may be divided by criteria such as age and gender, 
or other distinctions, like location or income. Consumer-based market segmentation can be performed on a product 
specific basis to provide a close match between specific products and individuals. However, a number of generic market 
segment systems also exist; for example, the system may provide a broad segmentation of the population of a country or 
territory based on statistical analysis of household and geodemographic data. Geographic information is very often 
indeed fundamental in the process of planning and implementing marketing activities. 
97 See European Commission, Eurostat, Consumer Prices Research, An experimental analysis into the measurement of 
indicative price levels for consumer products, fourth pilot (2012). In this article, I am only giving some examples of the 
lower prices in the periphery. Several other examples are provided in the Eurostat study. However, it should not be 
assumed that prices in Europe are always lower in the periphery. For example, the Ikea Billy Index shows that some 
prices in the periphery are higher than in the center. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-17/ikea-keeps-lid-
on-billy-prices-in-europe-as-inflation-weakens.  
98 European Commission, Car prices within the European Union, Competition Reports (2011), available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/motor_vehicles/prices/2011_07_full.pdf.  
Car price – VW Polo
98
 
Country Indicative price, 
€ 
Slovenia (periphery) 8014 
Cyprus (periphery) 8094 
Greece (periphery) 8231 
Malta (periphery) 8999 
Poland (periphery) 9045 
Estonia (periphery) 9102 
Finland (centre) 9343 
Ireland  9537 
The Netherlands (centre) 9766 
Spain  9916 
France (centre) 9933 
Belgium (centre) 10039 
Italy  10096 
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99 European Commission, Eurostat, Detailed average prices report (2014). All other tables that follow are based on this 
Eurostat’s report. 
Luxembourg (centre) 10215 
Austria (centre) 10228 
Germany (centre) 10315 
Slovakia (periphery) -- 
Men’s blue jeans
99
 
Country Indicative price, 
€ 
Bulgaria (periphery) 29,82 
Hungary (periphery) 30,96 
Malta (periphery) 31,38 
Czech Republic (periphery) 37,86 
Lithuania (periphery) 39,28 
Slovakia (periphery) 46,74 
Croatia (periphery) 47,16 
Slovenia (periphery) 49,21 
Cyprus (periphery) 49,28 
Belgium (centre) 56,02 
Italy 61,57 
Austria (centre) 64,91 
The Netherlands (centre) 72,13 
United Kingdom (centre) -- 
Spain -- 
Romania (periphery) -- 
Poland (periphery) -- 
Luxembourg (centre) -- 
Latvia (periphery) -- 
Ireland -- 
Germany (centre) -- 
Finland (centre) -- 
Estonia (periphery) -- 
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Loaf of white bread 
Country Indicative price, 
€ 
Bulgaria (periphery) 0,72 
Czech Republic (periphery) 0,89 
Hungary (periphery) 0,95 
Romania (periphery) 1,00 
Poland (periphery) 1,07 
Lithuania (periphery) 1,61 
Ireland  1,62 
Croatia (periphery) 1,64 
The Netherlands (centre) 1,68 
Latvia (periphery) 1,68 
Cyprus (periphery) 1,74 
Slovenia (periphery) 1,85 
United Kingdom (centre) 2,05 
Malta (periphery) 2,06 
Belgium (centre) 2,76 
Spain  2,79 
Italy  2,86 
Luxembourg (centre) 3,88 
Finland (centre) 3,96 
Austria (centre) 5,36 
Germany (centre) -- 
Estonia (periphery) -- 
Slovakia (periphery) -- 
 
 
Fresh tomatoes 
Country Indicative price, 
€ 
Bulgaria (periphery) 1,02 
Romania (periphery) 1,24 
Cyprus (periphery) 1,29 
Estonia (periphery) 1,39 
Lithuania (periphery) 1,40 
Czech Republic (periphery) 1,43 
Malta (periphery) 1,44 
Poland (periphery) 1,46 
Hungary (periphery) 1,67 
Slovakia (periphery) 1,68 
Latvia (periphery) 1,73 
Slovenia (periphery) 1,81 
Croatia (periphery) 1,81 
The Netherlands (centre) 1,91 
Belgium (centre) 1,93 
Luxembourg (centre) 2,07 
Finland (centre) 2,10 
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Italy  2,32 
Austria (centre) 2,55 
Germany (centre) -- 
Spain  -- 
United Kingdom (centre) -- 
Ireland  -- 
 
 
Potatoes 
Country Indicative price, 
€ 
Poland (periphery) 0,33 
Latvia (periphery) 0,40 
Lithuania (periphery) 0,41 
Estonia (periphery) 0,47 
Romania (periphery) 0,49 
Bulgaria (periphery) 0,58 
Hungary (periphery) 0,65 
Czech Republic (periphery) 0,65 
Slovakia (periphery) 0,69 
Croatia (periphery) 0,70 
Malta (periphery) 0,74 
Cyprus (periphery) 0,76 
Slovenia (periphery) 0,82 
The Netherlands (centre) 1,03 
Finland (centre) 1,04 
Italy  1,11 
Spain  1,14 
United Kingdom (centre) 1,15 
Belgium (centre) 1,26 
Luxembourg (centre) 1,39 
Austria (centre) 1,41 
Ireland  -- 
Germany (centre) -- 
 
 
Mineral salt 
Country Indicative price, 
€ 
The Netherlands (centre) 2,28 
Finland (centre) 2,35 
Poland (periphery) 2,47 
Latvia (periphery) 2,47 
Bulgaria (periphery) 2,47 
Malta (periphery) 2,53 
Estonia (periphery) 2,71 
United Kingdom (centre) 2,77 
Slovakia (periphery) 3,12 
Italy  3,13 
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Lithuania (periphery) 3,20 
Austria (centre) 3,24 
Croatia (periphery) 3,36 
Slovenia (periphery) 3,53 
Belgium (centre) 3,55 
Hungary (periphery) 3,74 
Luxembourg (centre) 4,84 
Cyprus (periphery) 4,99 
Ireland  -- 
Romania (periphery) -- 
Czech Republic (periphery) -- 
Spain  -- 
Germany (centre) -- 
 
 
 
 
 
Cigarettes 
Country Indicative price, 
€ 
Bulgaria (periphery) 2,45 
Lithuania (periphery) 2,46 
Latvia (periphery) 2,73 
Croatia (periphery) 2,73 
Estonia (periphery) 2,78 
Czech Republic (periphery) 2,89 
Romania (periphery) 2,93 
Slovakia (periphery) 3,04 
Hungary (periphery) 3,12 
Slovenia (periphery) 3,66 
Cyprus (periphery) 4,00 
Malta (periphery) 4,33 
Austria (centre) 4,41 
Luxembourg (centre) 4,42 
Italy  4,83 
Germany (centre) 5,14 
Belgium (centre) 5,59 
The Netherlands (centre) 6,14 
Ireland  9,34 
United Kingdom (centre) 9,50 
Finland (centre) -- 
Sweden (centre) -- 
Denmark (centre) -- 
France (centre) -- 
Spain  -- 
Hungary (periphery) -- 
Greece (periphery) -- 
Poland (periphery) -- 
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Cinema ticket 
Country Indicative price, 
€ 
Croatia (periphery) 3,37 
Bulgaria (periphery) 3,89 
Slovakia (periphery) 3,91 
Poland (periphery) 4,06 
Czech Republic (periphery) 4,42 
Lithuania (periphery) 4,44 
Hungary (periphery) 4,62 
Slovenia (periphery) 5,35 
Malta (periphery) 5,65 
Italy  7,82 
Germany (centre) 7,83 
Cyprus (periphery) 8,00 
Luxembourg (centre) 8,14 
Belgium (centre) 8,70 
Austria (centre) 8,76 
Ireland  8,99 
The Netherlands (centre) 9,16 
Finland (centre) 11,26 
United Kingdom (centre) -- 
Spain  -- 
Romania (periphery) -- 
Latvia (periphery) -- 
Estonia (periphery) -- 
 
 
Daily newspaper 
Country Indicative price, 
€ 
Romania (periphery) 0,37 
Bulgaria (periphery) 0,39 
Slovakia (periphery) 0,45 
Lithuania (periphery) 0,47 
Hungary (periphery) 0,55 
Poland (periphery) 0,58 
Czech Republic (periphery) 0,67 
Malta (periphery) 0,69 
Croatia (periphery) 0,92 
Austria (centre) 1,00 
Belgium (centre) 1,18 
Slovenia (periphery) 1,31 
Italy  1,33 
Luxembourg (centre) 1,35 
The Netherlands (centre) 1,58 
Cyprus (periphery) 1,74 
Latvia (periphery) 1,98 
Germany (centre) 2,11 
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United Kingdom (centre) -- 
Spain  -- 
Ireland  -- 
Finland (centre) -- 
Estonia (periphery) -- 
 
 
Cup of coffee 
Country Indicative price, 
€ 
Bulgaria (periphery) 0,56 
Hungary (periphery) 0,84 
Czech Republic (periphery) 0,89 
Lithuania (periphery) 0,92 
Italy  0,93 
Slovakia (periphery) 0,95 
Croatia (periphery) 0,98 
Romania (periphery) 1,01 
Slovenia (periphery) 1,17 
Poland (periphery) 1,21 
Malta (periphery) 1,46 
Cyprus (periphery) 1,88 
Germany (centre) 1,91 
Belgium (centre) 2,02 
Finland (centre) 2,05 
The Netherlands (centre) 2,19 
Luxembourg (centre) 2,26 
United Kingdom (centre) 2,37 
Austria (centre) 2,61 
Sweden (centre) -- 
Spain  -- 
Portugal (periphery) -- 
Latvia (periphery) -- 
Ireland  -- 
Greece (periphery) -- 
France (centre) -- 
Estonia (periphery) -- 
Denmark (centre) -- 
 
 
White sugar 
Country Indicative price, 
€ 
Poland (periphery) 0,86 
Croatia (periphery) 0,89 
Hungary (periphery) 0,93 
Czech Republic (periphery) 0,93 
Germany (centre) 0,94 
Spain  0,99 
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The Netherlands (centre) 1,04 
Belgium (centre) 1,04 
Estonia (periphery) 1,06 
Bulgaria (periphery) 1,07 
Slovenia (periphery) 1,08 
Romania (periphery) 1,08 
Slovakia (periphery) 1,09 
Lithuania (periphery) 1,12 
Finland (centre) 1,13 
Latvia (periphery) 1,14 
United Kingdom (centre) 1,15 
Italy  1,15 
Austria (centre) 1,20 
Luxembourg (centre) 1,27 
Malta (periphery) 1,32 
Cyprus (periphery) 1,32 
Ireland 1,35 
 
How can this difference in markets be exploited? The price elasticity of demand measures how much 
the quantity demanded of a good changes when its price changes.
100
 The more elastic the demand 
curve facing the firm, the more limited the extent to which a firm can increase prices. A company 
might decide to use different pricing system on the market of the center and of the periphery, raising 
the price in the centre where the purchasing power is higher and reducing it in the periphery, 
increasing its profit margins. The reduction in quantity sold in the center because of the higher price is 
outweighed by the increased quantity a company sells in the periphery.  
An increase in price is accompanied by a reduction in the level of sales. What is true for an individual 
consumer is true for the market as a whole; the market demand curve is the aggregation of individual 
demand curves. In a market with a lower purchasing power, the increased price will result in a lower 
demand more quickly than in a market with high purchasing power. This is a case particularly for 
luxury goods, but also for essential necessities. Because of higher price elasticity of demand, 
consumers on the market with lower purchasing power react to a change of price more radically than 
consumers on the market with higher purchasing power. The quantity lost as a result of a higher price 
set in the centre, in a market with higher purchasing power, is therefore offset by the increased 
quantity sold as a result of a lower price on the market with lower purchasing power. The price 
differences therefore can be exploited. As it will be further argued below, this enables a select 
privilege to harm to companies of the European center with potentially devastating consequences for 
companies of the periphery.  
Dumping in international trade 
To further portray the phenomenon "dumping practices of the center“ in the European Union, I will 
first explain how dumping is understood in international trade. There is a continuing debate in 
international economic law as to which trade policies and practices are fair and which are to be 
prohibited. Dumping has been in the heart of these debates. Many countries have long feared that their 
industries would suffer from foreign competitors selling at low prices. Dumping has been widely 
                                                     
100 See for instance Paul A. Samuelson, William D. Nordhaus, Microeconomics, 64-68 (16th edition 1998). I am here using 
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recognized as an undesirable practice since the early twentieth century and multilaterally, since the 
GATT Uruguay round. Dumping has been considered a trade practice that leaves domestic producers 
defenseless, and that could lead to the disappearance of domestic production of the merchandise at 
stake altogether.
101
 Today, antidumping proceedings are increasing rapidly. Antidumping action was 
initially implemented by developed countries, such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the 
European Union, but there has been an increased enforcement of antidumping in emerging markets, 
such as those of India, China, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and South Africa.
102
  
Dumping is the action of private firms of manufacturers, not governments.
103 
However, it is recognized 
that governments enforce other market-restrictive measures that enable market segmentation, which 
allow exporters to maintain higher prices on their home market. As a general rule, it is considered that 
companies can operate price discrimination, i.e., apply different prices between domestic and export 
sales, when their home market is not freely accessible to imports of the goods in question while the 
export markets are. Dumping is thus possible by market segregation. The profits gained in restricted 
markets allow companies to reduce their export prices even below (full) cost of production to gain 
market share and increased economies of scale.  
Dumping is broadly defined as exporting at prices below those charged on the domestic market (or, if 
none, on a third-country market). This is called international price discrimination. Internationally, 
price discrimination may occur when demand in the export market is more elastic than it is in the 
domestic market (i.e., consumers are more responsive to lower prices). It has become accepted 
internationally that antidumping laws may also apply when an agent exports goods at prices that do 
not cover the cost of production. Dumping can thus also mean selling at prices insufficient to cover the 
cost of the goods sold, as in selling for export at prices below those necessary to cover production 
costs (below cost sales).
104
 This type of dumping can be beneficial to exporters even in situations 
where their domestic sales are made at a loss, as long as export prices exceed variable costs. Thus, 
dumped exports help to reduce the exporter’s per unit cost of production.  
Rationale for the prohibition of dumping  
Important income or distributional effects result from dumping. It is assumed that dumping generally 
makes consumers in the higher-priced market worse off and the producer better off.
105
 But it is not 
universally assumed that the economy itself is worse off overall. The price discriminator will probably 
increase its output to supply the lower-priced market, a result that economists would usually view as 
desirable because it offsets the undesirable supply-restricting behavior that would otherwise occur.  
However, even if price discrimination is not detrimental to the world as a whole, it could be beneficial 
to one national economy and detrimental to another. In economic theory, it is generally accepted that 
dumping does not have any significant adverse effect on the exporting country. If dumping does harm 
to the exporting economy, it is because of an adverse effect on price levels in that economy. Dumping 
could also harm users of the dumped product who live in the exporting country. This harm can occur 
only if the dumped product is an intermediate product, such as a component of a final product. In such 
cases, if users of the dumped product compete with users in the exporting country, they will have a 
                                                     
101 John Howard Jackson, William J. Davey, A. O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, Cases, 
Materials and Texts, 686-687 (4th edition, 2001). 
102 Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia's Emerging Giants, 53 Harvard Int’l L. J. 101, 103 (2012). See also Wolfgang Mueller, 
Nicholas Khan, and Tibor Scharf, EC and WTO Anti-Dumping Law (2009).  
103 Ibid. 
104 John Howard Jackson, William J. Davey, A. O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, Cases, 
Materials and Texts (4th edition, 2001). 
105 CL Erickson, S Kuruvilla, Labor costs and the social dumping debate in the European Union, Industrial and Lab. 
Relations Rev. 181 (1994). 
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cost advantage because of their access to the lower-priced, dumped product. These users may be able 
to sell a final product that incorporates the dumped component more cheaply, thereby gaining an 
advantage over competing producers in the exporting country. The significance of this advantage 
would depend on the importance of the dumped component in the cost of the final product and the 
extent of competition among producers in the two countries.  
It is not clear, on the basis of economic analysis, that dumping harms the exporting country on 
balance, although it is probably the case that the benefit to the dumper outweighs possible losses to the 
consumers at home.
106
 Much more telling is the fact that exporting countries have not thought it 
worthwhile to control dumping, which strongly suggests that dumping does not have any significant 
adverse effect on the exporting country. 
Rather, the rationale for prohibiting dumping is provided by the effect of dumping on the country 
where these goods are imported. It is generally agreed that consumers in the importing country will 
benefit from the lower prices resulting from dumping (at least in the short run), and that producers in 
the importing country who compete with the dumpers will be injured because they will lose market 
share to the dumpers.
107
 Dumping has a significant potential to harm existing or potential industry in 
the importing country. Moreover, goods dumping can negatively affect the investment climate in the 
importing market, particularly in an economic downturn and particularly on capital-intensive industry 
characterized by a high sunk investment and relatively low variable cost.
108
 
Conditions for the imposition of antidumping duties 
First, antidumping laws allow a country to impose temporary countervailing duties on dumped goods, 
dumped either as a result of price discrimination or by below-cost sales. Under the rules of the GATT, 
an unfair price is determined by the standard of “normal value“ of the product.  
According to Article VI of the GATT, a product is to be considered as being introduced into the 
commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of the product exported 
from one country to another 
1. is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when 
destined for consumption in the exporting country; 
2. or in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either: 
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in the 
ordinary course of trade; 
(ii) or the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable 
addition for selling cost and profit. 
Second, dumping is deemed to be an unfair business practice when it causes injury. Article VI of the 
GATT authorizes the imposition of antidumping measures to offset dumping if it causes material 
injury to a domestic industry. Before antidumping duties can be imposed by the aggrieved country 
under WTO law, the importing nation must determine that imports of dumped merchandise have 
caused material injury, or threatened material injury, to the domestic industry producing the like 
product, or that the imports are materially retarding the establishment of a domestic industry.  
                                                     
106 John Howard Jackson, William J. Davey, A. O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, Cases, 
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Indeed, the spectrum of injury by dumping practices can be quite broad. This is why countries adopt a 
broad definition of dumping. For instance, to impose antidumping duties under US law, it is necessary 
that the US International Trade Commission find that imports of merchandise sold at less than fair 
value have materially injured, or threatened to materially injure, a US industry producing the like 
product or are materially retarding the establishment of a US industry that may not yet exist.  
Third, the proceeding inquires whether the unfairly traded imports cause or threaten material injury, or 
retard the establishment of a new industry. If injury or threat is present, its cause must be determined 
as the third stage of the analysis.
109
  
Dumping of the European center 
Effects on the actors of the center 
 
As set forth, then, dumping generally has three basic features. First, price discrimination or below-cost 
sales, i.e., selling at less than a good’s normal value. Second, injury to the importing economy or 
threat of such injury. And third, proof that selling at less than a good’s normal value causes this injury 
or threat of such injury. All these features are present in the doctrine that I have termed as “dumping 
practices of the center.” I will now turn to the explanation of the benefit and injury of goods dumping 
on internal market, without explicitly addressing the notion of causation, as proving causation is a 
matter of factual proof in any individual case. 
Dumping can have clear advantages for an individual exporter. A profitable home market provides a 
platform that may be used to operate in export markets at prices much lower than would have been 
possible without market segmentation. The low export prices generate further sales, which in turn 
lower the costs of production––an advantage which benefits both exports and home sales. The 
expansion of the center’s industry to the periphery, while harming the periphery’s competition, thus 
benefits both exports and sales at home, thus generating further sales and lower costs of production. 
Lower production costs also enable a company of the center to decrease its price there, which shields 
such companies both from competitors that may not engage in dumping to the periphery as well as 
from potential parallel imports into the center. In Myrdal’s language, the upward spiral110 of 
production of the companies of the center is thus ensured.  
Further benefits of dumping for the exporting country’s economy are that domestic industries develop 
capacities that far exceed the size of the national market. This allows high economic growth and high 
production levels, even in periods of domestic or worldwide recession. Furthermore, it facilitates 
strategic targeting of key industrial sectors in important markets. This can result in a high trade surplus 
and possibly dominant positions in the industrial sectors concerned.  
Dumping can even be beneficial in situations where home market sales are made at a loss. As long as 
the latter cover fixed costs, export sales can be priced as low as variable cost, a strategy that permits 
production and employment to be maintained in a recession, or enables an aggressor to obtain 
considerable advantages when aiming for economies of scale. Companies with a sanctuary market can 
thus export recession to countries or regions with companies without such a sanctuary market, thereby 
destabilizing such economies.  
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Trade 1994). 
110 See Gunnar Myrdal Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions (1957). 
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The European Commission’s report on dumping111 gives an example of how a dumper retains 
production and employment in its home market despite a falling demand or increased competition. 
This example depicts the ability of the companies of the center to harm, if not consistently destroy, the 
periphery’s industries.  
Dumping is profitable for exporters even where their domestic prices are made at a loss. Imagine an 
exporter that produces 1000 units with fixed costs of 7000 and a variable cost of 3 per unit, which 
would imply a breakeven price of 10.
112
 In a period where demand and prices fall, perhaps due to 
recession or increased competition, the exporter can only sell 800 units on the home market at a price 
of 8.75, a level that would cover fixed costs but leave a loss of 2.400. In this position, dumping abroad 
would permit an exporter to  
1. maintain employment and production by selling 800 domestically at a price of 8.75 and 
exporting the remaining 200 at the variable cost of 3, without increasing overall loss; 
2. maintain employment and production by selling 800 domestically at a price of 8.75, export the 
remaining 200 units at 6, and thus reduce loss to 1.800; 
3. or create more employment by increasing production to 1600 units, sell 800 domestically at a 
price of 8.75, and export 800 at 6; thus, through the increased production, the breakeven level is 
reduced to 7.4, which makes home sales profitable to the extent that losses on export sales are 
offset (i.e., eliminate the overall loss). 
Even if a local producer were as efficient as the exporter initially, the dumper’s attack would quickly 
propel it into a situation of failing prices, declining sales, and increasing costs. The periphery’s 
producers are rarely as efficient, as their productivity is lower due to a number of factors, such as less 
developed logistics, services, inferior education structure, and so on. Their position becomes the more 
difficult as the dumper may be able to sustain losses on its export business for long periods because of 
its “guaranteed” home market profits. The resulting cost increases and losses may also affect the 
industry’s position in third markets. As a result, the periphery industry’s overall productivity and 
investment strength is weakened.  
The impact of dumping on the importing country as a whole is the reverse of the impact on the 
exporting country. There may be an immediate advantage through the availability of cheap imports, 
but the total cost of dumping to the domestic economy must be accounted for in terms of lost 
capacities, lost investment, and lost technology, especially in promising or strategic sectors, as well as 
in the shrinking industrial base, the social cost of unemployment, and the contraction or elimination of 
whole industries. Failing prices, fierce and powerful competition of the (often) capital-laden and 
prestigious companies of the center, declining sales, and increasing cost thus together work to create a 
downward spiral for the periphery.  
Companies of the center, on the other hand, have a platform upon which to expand, increase 
production, employ workers, and increase income and profits––all which contribute toward the 
center’s upward spiral. The options available to the exporter stemmed from market segmentation and 
the fact that fixed costs could be covered by sales at home; but while companies of the center are 
established and thus able to charge high prices, companies of the periphery do not enjoy such a luxury.  
The center’s dumping might be short-term, aimed to secure market entry, or longer-term, which may 
cause even greater injury to local production. Dumping can be cyclical. This occurs in industries 
subject to periodic excess supply and capacity in which there is an incentive to export during the 
period of shrinking domestic demand to dump the excess production at prices below full cost, thus 
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exporting unemployment.
113
 Strategic dumping aims to achieve a strong position in important export 
markets. The long-term character of such dumping usually stems from the fact that the dumper 
operates from a home market base where foreign competition is weak or nonexistent. This strategy has 
as its main aim the expansion of production to benefit from economies of scale.
114
 
The advantages derived from dumping can thus significantly outweigh disadvantages stemming from 
protection of the home market, in particular relatively high consumer prices. If dumping is not below 
cost, but is a result of mere price discrimination, the dumper at best incurs a relative loss. It is actually 
difficult to speak in terms of loss at all, but rather a smaller profit, in the short term. The smaller profit 
incurred by the dumper is thus in the short term easily offset by the higher price charged in the 
domestic, center market. In the long term, the smaller profit will be well compensated by the market 
share a company of the center was able to carve out in the periphery’s market.  
Effects on the actors of the periphery 
A domestic industry facing dumped imports is in a difficult position, as it is faced with powerful 
competitors selling at low prices. Dumping often significantly injures the periphery’s industry that 
produces the like product, often leading to a cease in production or slow the establishment of such 
industry in the periphery.  
What are the periphery companies’ possibilities to retaliate and adopt practices to keep out 
competition? Can they themselves engage in goods dumping? One possible reaction to a competitor’s 
low prices would be to sell on the center’s market at equally low prices. Companies of the periphery 
could do this, because there are no access barriers on the internal market. However, reducing prices in 
a market with lower elasticity of demand and increasing them in a higher-elasticity market makes little 
economic sense. 
So could periphery companies play the same game as companies at the center? Could they engage in 
similar practices of price discrimination, increasing their prices on center markets and reducing prices 
in the periphery? They could, but their ability to raise prices in the center’s market without losing 
market share is limited, and it also depends on the draw of their existing market position. Their 
competitiveness in the markets of the center is often not based on brand power or prestige, and they 
might have limited resources to engage in powerful advertising campaigns. Rather, the 
competitiveness of these companies is more often based on the lower prices they can offer. Once they 
increase their low prices in the center, their market position is weakened.  
The center has a wealthy domestic sanctuary market with high purchasing power to shield its 
companies and allows them to reduce prices in the periphery. Center companies can also afford to 
charge relatively higher prices in their home markets because they are relatively established there. 
Competitive pressure certainly exists on the center’s markets; while it may not always allow 
significant price increases, a higher priced market at home nonetheless provides a powerful platform 
from which companies of the center operate.
115
  
The periphery lacks such a profitable home market––one that would provide a platform from which to 
operate in export markets at prices lower than otherwise possible without market segmentation. This 
                                                     
113 European Commission, Eleventh Annual Report by the Commission to the European Parliament on the Community's Anti-
dumping and Anti-subsidy Activities COM (93) 516 final (1993) and John Howard Jackson, William J. Davey, A. O. 
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prevents periphery companies from lowering prices indefinitely in their domestic markets. And they 
can rarely afford price wars, as their pockets are often not as deep as those of the companies of the 
center.  
Operating from a sanctuary market can confer on exporters an advantage that cannot be matched by 
their competitors in the importing country. This provides the dumper with the opportunity to maximize 
profits or minimize losses, which can be highly injurious for the importing country’s industry.  
One could argue that exporting cheaper products to the center’s market by peripheral companies 
paying lower wages to their workers is a form of dumping already (despite the fact that this is, in the 
current literature and regulatory regime, not perceived as dumping but as a regular practice of 
comparative advantage). But periphery companies, given their lower productivity, can rarely afford to 
pay the same wages as the center’s companies. As a result, the periphery indeed sometimes, but not 
always, produces cheaper products because of the lower costs of labor. But lower costs of labor are a 
decreasing cost for many industries,
116
 and are far from the only cost that determines a product’s price. 
Instead, a company’s competitiveness depends on a variety of factors, and often, though certainly not 
always, lower labor cost is the only factor in which periphery’s companies have a comparative 
advantage. 
Classical economic theory teaches us that restrictions in trade are negative, as factors of productions 
will not be put to their most productive use. Furthermore, it teaches us that the losers will divert their 
production to more efficient ends. Following this logic, the lower the pricing of the center’s 
companies, the more the companies of the periphery will divert production to a more productive use, 
and thus also benefit. The idea that this approach benefits companies of the periphery, as they will 
reorient production to a most efficient use, is based on an assumption about the future that may or may 
not materialize. The company might simply close down, and the unemployment of workers and disuse 
of other production factors would ensue. This is not just a factual observation about the possibilities of 
people’s future reaction, which is difficult to predict, but a conceptual one. And when there is a 
structure requiring the reorientation of production, this logic becomes even more problematic. 
According to Gunnar Myrdal, an accidental change in a cause of events that is not immediately 
cancelled out by the stream of events produces a different reaction in a developed than it does in an 
undeveloped society.
117
 In other words, competitors and communities in a wealthy economy have a 
greater ability to adapt to competitive pressure than those in poorer economies. A trade loss can elicit a 
creative response in a more advanced economy given its higher human capital, better education, and 
denser clusters of firms and networks of production as compared to poorer economies. The erosion of 
the entrenched position may invite governmental, social, and private initiatives to enlarge the role of 
the activities people do not yet know how to repeat, broadening access to the opportunities and 
resources of production for more economic agents.
118
 Thus, a wealthy economy can be more adaptable 
to change and competitive pressure, which can even contribute to the upward spiral of an already more 
advanced economy.  
On the other hand, in a less advanced economy, loss from free trade will present itself in a different 
key, with fewer resources and opportunities to respond through compensation, innovation, and 
reconstruction. Moreover, while some losers might be compensated, though on a smaller scale than is 
the case of an advanced economy, there will not, even in principle, be a way of compensating the most 
important form of loss: the inhibition of change––the entrance of firms and workers in the emerging 
economy into lines of production in which the relatively more advanced economy enjoys an 
entrenched position. These losers cannot even in principle be compensated for the simple reason that 
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they do not yet exist. They are potential, not already existing economic agents,
119
 as the existing 
dumping discourse already recognizes.  
Incoherence of the consumer welfare standard 
 
The aim of competition law that many competition authorities have increasingly stressed is the 
maximization of consumer welfare. Despite differences in the approach of various regulatory 
jurisdictions as to how that goal should be achieved and how to address consumer welfare,
120
 this 
concept has become the dominant goal of US, EU, and South African antitrust laws.
121
 The 
relationship between competitors on the market in current antitrust law thinking is thus resolved from 
the standpoint of an imaginary consumer. The consumer has been reduced to someone whose welfare 
increases when he or she pays as little as possible for a product. This reductionism has become the 
benchmark according to which competition issues can be adjudicated.  
Typically, price discrimination leads to lower prices for some consumers and higher prices for others. 
Goods dumping appears to favor the consumers and downstream producers of the periphery. They are 
said to pay less for products than the center’s consumers and the downstream producers pay, and, in 
this analysis, are likely to enjoy benefits from dumped imports through low prices. From the 
perspective of the periphery, goods dumping should thus be welcomed.  
Indeed, some of the benefits of lower prices of goods may go to downstream producers in the 
periphery. The benefit to the downstream producer is also considered by the European Commission in 
finally determining the measure to counteract dumping in international trade.
122
 This is an additional 
criterion to be taken into consideration, and it enables the European Commission to decide not to 
impose antidumping measures if the overall economic interests in the EU should find such measures to 
be harmful. The interests of domestic industry producing the product concerned, importers, Union 
industries that use the imported product and would pay a higher price following antidumping 
measures, and interests of the end consumer of the product are taken into consideration in this 
analysis.  
On the internal market, dumping of the center, while having a negative impact on direct competitors, 
may thus have a positive impact on the downstream producers of the periphery. Nonetheless, the value 
of lower prices of inputs to the periphery’s downstream producers can be limited, because it is more 
often the periphery that provides inputs for final products of the center, not vice versa, as peripheral 
companies generally find themselves lower on the chain of worldwide productions.  
Furthermore, the analysis reveals a larger problem of the consumer welfare standard. Market 
economics assumes that consumers are “best off if they can make voluntary exchanges of goods and 
services in competitive markets”123  Maximization of the consumer surplus seeks the largest net gain 
of consumer when buying a product. Consumer surplus refers to the difference between consumers' 
valuations and the price they actually pay. Producer surplus is the difference between the price 
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producers are paid for what they sell and the cost of production. Total welfare is the sum of consumer 
surplus and producer surplus. When the price is elevated above marginal cost, there is a deadweight 
loss, the sacrifice in total surplus for units not purchased due to price elevation. From this perspective, 
lost consumer surplus is the sum of deadweight loss and the amount transferred from consumers to 
producers.  
According to Hovenkamp, an antitrust policy of maximizing consumer welfare is really a policy of 
maximizing everyone's welfare, at least in their capacity as consumers.
124
 The benefit to consumers 
has been lauded as the main objective of antitrust enforcement in several jurisdictions.
125
 The US 
Supreme Court has also consistently held that the Sherman Act protects all victims of violations – not 
just the end users. The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise commented: “Every member of society is a 
consumer, while not everyone is an entrepreneur, so the most ‘populist’ goal of all may be the one that 
promotes consumer welfare.”126 Thus, according to Areeda and Hovenkamp, “any interest group 
approach to antitrust is best off to recognize ‘consumers’ as its protected class.”127 Therefore, 
Hovenkamp argues "an antitrust policy of maximizing consumer welfare is really a policy of 
maximizing everyone's welfare, at least in their capacity of consumers."
128
  
However, the consumer welfare as well as total welfare analysis focus solely on the quantitative aspect 
and the price of the good in measuring consumer benefit, without any regard to the quality and nature 
of the product. Consumers of the periphery may not necessarily be better off because domestic 
producers are forced to lower production as a result of goods dumping of the center, or very often, 
cease it altogether. Local competition and variety are thus reduced and cherished local products are 
wiped off the market, all of which is unlikely to serve consumer interest.  
Moreover, and more importantly for the argument that consumer welfare alone cannot serve as an apt 
goal of antitrust and trade policy goal, each of us is a bundle of injuries and recognitions in every 
moment in time that sets us into a particular situation in the hierarchical structure of production of 
goods, services, knowledge and so on.
129
 They constitute us as subjects. We are injured not only as 
consumers but also simultaneously as workers, or as members of a particular community. In other 
words, the imaginary consumer of antitrust law is the consumer who buys products, not a consumer 
who earns money for their work. Neither the stand-alone consumer welfare standard nor the total 
welfare standard take this into consideration, as they consider a consumer and producer as detached 
from each other. The difficulty of the analysis is not only hidden in the fact that consumers are an 
internally fragmented group
130
, but that consumer welfare analysis untenably distinguishes between a 
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consumer and a producer.
131
 Reliance on the maximization of common interest between an abstract 
class of consumers and abstract class of producers (elimination of deadweight loss) in the calculation 
of maximization of welfare thus does not give us a good account of the welfare we are producing. 
While the consumer of the periphery benefits from lower price, he loses money simultaneously as a 
producer or member of a community on a downward spiral. Harm to the consumer employed by 
companies and living under the constraints of local budgets that lose out as a result of the structural 
downward spiral of their economies is missed in an understanding of antitrust or trade law focused on 
consumer benefit.  
What does the concentration of capital, technology, productive capacity and knowledge in the 
European center mean for the spiritual development and economic and personal growth of the 
peripheral consumer? For example, what does it mean for a young graduate unable to find suitable 
employment in his own region or country or for a worker who has been made redundant, or whose 
salary is decreasing because he or she is paid out of the budget of a community on a downward spiral 
or for an artist unable to get funding for his work
132
? If a particular group of consumers is structurally 
condemned to lower wages or unemployment because its members are consumers of a peripheral 
economy, the fact that they pay lower prices for products in their local shops may not necessarily favor 
them. 
On the other hand, a consumer of the center who is paying a higher price for products as a result of 
market segregation, appears to lose, but gains at the same time as a producer. A success of the 
company that dumps goods on the peripheral market does not only translate into owner's benefits, 
labor may appropriate part of the gain.
133
 Equity interests may be owned by middle-income individual 
investors.
134
 Local banks are not faced with defaulting credits when companies prosper and 
technology, new ideas and practices may develop as a result of corporate success.  
The consumer welfare standard governs our thinking about antitrust and trade law, despite the fact that 
it is based on untenable assumptions and distinctions. Low consumer prices thus cannot be a sufficient 
indicator of people’s well-being and cannot offer adequate normative guidance for our decision-
making. Moreover, the cost of living in the poorest countries in the world, for those “consumers” 
confined to local conditions and standards, is the lowest
135
, but hardly anyone aspires to such a living 
standard.  
Predatory pricing 
One could think of other competition policy measures, aside from international anti-dumping law per 
se, which might affect or restrain the described practice of dumping of the center. For example, the 
doctrine of predatory pricing. However, I argue that the practices I am describing are not caught by 
any of the existing competition policy measures which ensure that firms and governments are not able 
to implement or support anticompetitive or market segmenting strategies. The doctrine of predatory 
pricing, a doctrine of both EU as well as US antitrust law
136
, together with the general prohibition of 
other practices under the “abuse of dominant position on the market”137 doctrine is assumed to 
adequately address the problem of low pricing abuse on the internal market. However, the prohibition 
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of predatory pricing, specifically,
138
 does not cover the center’s goods dumping as I have described it. 
Even a cursory analysis reveals why. In current antitrust thinking, selling below cost or price 
discrimination is considered to be harmful and actionable only if it is practiced with the intention of 
driving domestic firms out of business and (re)establishing a dominant position on the market.
 139
 The 
concern about predatory pricing is that firms might strategically cut prices to unprofitable levels in the 
short term to eliminate or discipline rivals and then raise long-run prices to supracompetitive levels, 
inflicting a net long-term injury on consumers. The problem is that such harmful predatory pricing is 
often hard to distinguish from desirable competitive price-cutting.
140
  
Prohibition of predatory pricing, targeting either specific below-cost or particular above-cost 
anticompetitive activities, prohibits abusive actions of an already dominant player on the market under 
Article 102 of the Treaty.
141
 Price reduction needs to be reactive to a market entrant and usually must 
be below average variable cost.
142
 Predatory pricing therefore means abusive anticompetitive activity 
of an already dominant player on a market, under the current understanding of dominance, who raises 
back the price once it has driven a competitor out of the market.
143
 
Dumping can be predatory (as some instances of dumping I described above would be), but most of 
dumping is not predatory. The practices of dumping of the center are neither necessarily of a company 
with a dominant position on a market, nor reactive to a new entrant to the market, nor must they 
involve selling below average variable cost. Nor is there any reason to think that unjustified harm of 
dumping occurs only when it is proven that the price was, after the competitor has left the market, 
increased to a level higher from its pre-predation level, as demanded by the doctrine of predatory 
pricing.
144
 Dumping is not simply a predatory mechanism; it is a much more general practice that can 
cause harm within the context of the European Union, and can particularly harm the actors of the 
periphery.
145
  
Arbitrage and corrective mechanisms 
Provided that the companies’ home market is shielded against the price drop that would neutralize 
price discrimination, dumping can have clear advantages for the individual exporter. Price 
discrimination is possible when a seller is able to identify separate markets for its product and charge a 
higher price in a market that attaches a greater utility to the products.
146
 As a general rule, companies 
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can use price discrimination, i.e., apply different prices between domestic and export sales, when their 
home market is not freely accessible to imports of the goods in question while the export markets are–
–in other words, when markets are segregated. 
 In international trade, a foreign producer enjoys a sanctuary home market for any number of reasons, 
including (a) the government’s unwillingness to enforce competition laws; (b) excessively high tariff 
rates for the product, as compared to other WTO members’ rates; (c) non-tariff barriers to entry such 
as abusive industry norms, standards, testing procedures, restrictions, or closed distribution systems; 
(d) the government’s implicit guarantee against continuing losses; and (e) market-distorting industrial 
policy. 
How can price discrimination be possible on the internal market? It is assumed that people, goods, 
services and capital circulate freely on the European internal market and that the regulatory work, 
including its implementation, is harmonized within the European Union. On this assumption, the 
dumper can only discriminate or sell below cost provided that his or her home market is shielded 
against arbitrage, i.e., resale or retaliation, and a consequent price drop that would neutralize 
discrimination. Import tariffs and measures of equivalent effect are strictly prohibited and the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice vigorously fight the restrictions of parallel imports and 
exclusive distribution systems.
147
  
It is assumed that an integrated market is a very hostile environment for those who attempt to make 
gains by sustained selling below cost. The assumption is that on the integrated market, governed by 
the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and people, which creates a level playing field 
and gives maximum impact to the role of market forces, firms are compelled to price in relation to 
efficiency.  
Based on this assumption, there is little incentive to carry out a strategy of below-cost selling or price 
discrimination on any other than a short-term basis, given that competitors are free to retaliate with 
equally low prices. Such a strategy would force prices down with no offsetting gain in terms of 
increased market share. With these inbuilt constraints on unfair pricing, competition rules can be 
restricted to maintain a level playing field, through action, for example, against cartels or abuse of 
dominant position.
148
 The general assumption in legal and economic theory is that dumping is 
therefore not possible on the internal market.
149
  
Under the conditions of the internal market, it is assumed that there would be only room for very 
limited and short-term price discrimination between different parts of the market, because this would 
lead to immediate arbitrage or retaliation by competitors. In other words, there must be some barrier 
between the markets so that the lower-priced goods are not resold in the higher-priced market by an 
arbitrageur.  
Vertical restraints are indeed designed to facilitate price discrimination against consumers.
150
 If, for 
example, a supplier sells at a higher price in geographic markets where consumers are richer and 
willing to pay more than consumers in poorer markets, the retailer in the poorer markets who has the 
option of buying at a lower price can resell to the richer markets. To prevent reselling, the 
manufacturer could impose vertical territorial restraints to prevent reselling to the richer markets and 
keep the markets segmented.  
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Antitrust rules prohibit several vertical agreements. Prohibition of exclusive distribution agreements 
and parallel imports are important parts of the EU’s (or the US’s) antitrust mechanism. Exclusive 
distribution or exclusive dealership is a legal relationship in which a retailer is given a guarantee by 
the manufacturer that no other retailer within its geographic area will be supplied by that 
manufacturer. The supplier’s purpose in granting exclusivity may be to provide the distributor with 
incentives to promote the product and provide better service to customers, but it may also enable price 
discrimination, because it does not allow others to sell on this particular territory at a lower price.   
Parallel import is the trade of products that takes place outside the official distribution system set up 
by a particular firm. The prohibition of parallel imports is indeed often a concomitant measure of the 
manufacturer toward exclusive distribution, because it ensures the exclusivity of a particular dealer, 
but it may also be a measure independent of an exclusive distribution agreement. Through their own 
distribution system, firms may cause differences in prices for different countries, exploiting national 
differences in the behavior of consumers. Parallel traders buy products in countries where they are 
sold at lower prices to sell them in high-price countries. The flow of products thereby created is called 
parallel trade.
151
 
European Union law has always been opposed to the presence in vertical agreements of territorial 
restrictions designed to prevent parallel trade between Member States. Parallel trade in fact concerns a 
significant amount of goods and services in certain economic sectors, such as motor vehicles or 
drugs.
152
 It is stimulated by the price differences between Member States, which are due to different 
factors such as taxation
153
, labor costs, and regulatory regimes, though the latter are becoming 
increasingly similar under internal market rules.  
In EU law, price discrimination has been viewed to cause significant harm, especially when the price 
discrimination is among different national markets. EU competition law has stressed the policy of 
creating a common market that transcends national boundaries. This is why EU competition 
authorities have been very strict in their evaluation of vertical agreements and may have been stricter 
than the authorities of other jurisdictions. As EU competition authorities are vigorously opposing such 
vertical agreements, the argument is that the prohibition of vertical agreements prevents price 
discrimination and works toward the equalization of prices in the Union.  
However, the conclusion that free movement and antitrust rules lead to the equalization of prices in the 
Union is not borne out by the numbers. As set out in section II. above, the annual price review in the 
European Union made by the Eurostat confirms that prices are often significantly lower in the 
European periphery than they are in the center.
154
  
Prohibition of vertical agreements does not necessarily lead to price increases in the periphery and to 
price reduction in the center. It does not prevent companies of the center to engage in goods dumping 
and harm the periphery. Why do prices remain different in the center and in the periphery, or within 
the center and within the periphery despite the internal market and despite the prohibition of vertical 
restraints?   
First, parallel imports, which could potentially work toward the equalization of prices, do not occur. 
There are various reasons for this. Consumers or entrepreneurs may not be aware of price differentials 
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due to the lack of information. When prices are set by the state, they are made public, and more 
transparent and parallel imports are likely to follow from them, as was the case in the 
GlaxoSmythKline case.
155
 When prices are set by corporations, a greater effort is needed to discover 
price differences.  
Furthermore, transaction costs present a large share of costs of any activity as well as those costs, 
including transport costs, administrative costs, and other opportunity costs, that might deter parallel 
trading. Viability of parallel trading also depends on the type of goods and on the existing 
segmentation within the markets of the center (and of the periphery). It is more difficult to imagine 
arbitrage for luxury goods, which are sold by licensed retailers in the center. For wealthy consumers, 
the option of buying luxury products from non-licensed distributors is not an appealing option as it 
reduces their prestige and raises doubts about quality. Outlet stores throughout the center often cater to 
the needs of its customers who are willing to buy from less reputed retailers at a lower price, which 
reduces the incentive of parallel trading. For perishable goods, parallel imports are also generally a 
less viable option. It may not prove to be profitable to transport perishable goods such as Danone 
yogurt, produced in France or Austria and shipped to, for instance, Romania, back to France or to 
Sweden.  
In addition, parallel import, which could potentially work for the equalization of prices does occur, but 
it does not result in a significant price increase in the center. Even if parallel import does occur, 
parallel importers who decide to pursue the business will add to the equation the transaction costs, 
including transport and their own margin to the lower price at which they buy a product. This again 
reduces pressure on prices in the center. Furthermore, very often, the markets of the periphery are 
smaller, either in terms of population or purchasing power, and when this is the case, parallel imports 
would have a more limited effect on the larger markets of the center.
156
 
The shortfall of parallel imports prohibition 
The reason EU law encourages parallel trading is to allow factors of production to move to the area 
where they are most valued, thus improving efficiency of the allocation of resources. This is assumed 
to also have a positive impact on social goals such as employment, improving workers’ welfare, and 
so on. The goal is not necessarily to equalize prices, though this is deemed to be the side effect of free 
movement provisions. Parallel trading would enable the movement of goods to their most efficient 
use––to the center, where consumers allegedly value them more because they are prepared to pay a 
higher price for them.
157
 This would result in a rise in prices in the periphery and would reduce prices 
in the center.  
However, any producer who wishes to raise prices in the periphery would face an immense 
countervailing buyer power––the population’s low purchasing power. Because purchasing power in 
the periphery is much lower, higher prices would result in a rapid decrease of quantity of demand 
(unless the goods are essential, in which case the elasticity of demand is lower).  
There is indeed a strong pressure for low prices in the periphery, also at the expense of quality. It is no 
secret that many center companies sell, under their brand, products of a lesser quality on Eastern and 
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Southern European markets.
158
 Some companies in the center ship second-rate goods to the periphery, 
or produce them at lower standards in the periphery, under the brand of the center. Because some of 
these products are sold under known brands––given that these companies have deep pockets to finance 
their advertising campaigns and due to the lack of information by the consumers living further away 
from the center countries––these companies retain large market shares in the periphery despite the fact 
their products are of lower quality than the ones sold in the center’s markets.159  
Consumers or consumer organizations have complained of a lesser quality for a range of products sold 
on the Eastern market––some for the same price and some for a lower price than that sold on the 
Western market.
 160
 These products are furthermore most often produced, based on the right to 
relocation bestowed to companies from high-wage countries by EU law in a Viking case scenario
161
, 
using cheaper labor in Eastern Europe, which enables them to cut prices further. 
The underlying reason for market segmentation 
Prices in the Union cannot be equalized by the prohibition of vertical agreements, i.e., “by the 
market.” Price differentials as well as wage differentials throughout the Union depend on a number of 
factors, such as different tax systems or productivity. But one of the key factors for different wages 
and prices in the EU is the difference in wealth between regions of Europe, and this factor is widely 
absent from legal (and economic) analysis of antitrust law.  
Companies of the center do not need to segment markets by vertical agreements. The territorial 
division of prices and different elasticity of demand is already prepared for them by the massive 
difference in development and wealth.
162
 They adjust their prices according to a preexisting condition. 
Pricing is often made according to the level of economic development of a country or a region, either 
by companies
163
 or by government regulation, as in the GlaxoSmithKline case.
164
 Price segmentation is 
not caused by territorial segmentation of the market by the actions of a particular agent. Lower prices 
in the periphery are due to the hierarchical deep structure of the Union. The periphery has lower wages 
and lower prices of products, and the actions of a single producer, independent of its position on the 
market, have a very limited effect on this structural difference.  
It would be therefore incorrect to conclude that markets in the Union cannot be or are not segmented 
because of free movement provisions or because of the prohibition of restrictions on parallel imports 
or exclusive distribution agreements. These provisions may sometimes lessen it, but they do not 
alleviate such segmentation. Keeping prices higher in the center and lower in the periphery may only 
sometimes be more difficult because of these provisions.  
Market segmentation is not a consequence of a sporadic action of a single dominant firm, or of an act 
of government (as generally in international trade), as the latter action would be prohibited under the 
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free movement provisions (of goods, services, capital or workers). Rather, it is inherent in the structure 
of the Union internal market. Then the question is––who is allowed by the legal system to take 
advantage of this segmentation?  
One of the goals of the single currency (the Euro) actually was to enable direct price comparisons to 
be made of products in different countries.
165
 This would also lead to the lowering of price 
differentials in different countries. Such gaps were deemed to be fuelled in part by different 
currencies. Nonetheless, the prices in the center simply reflect a higher living standard, and many have 
remained higher long after the adoption of the Euro.
166
 
The European internal market does not only suffer from segmented consumer markets; wage 
segregation is an obvious correlative phenomenon that triggered the Laval and Viking judgments
167
 in 
the first place. Wages in the periphery are much lower than they are in the center.
168
 Just as parallel 
imports and the prohibition of vertical agreements such as exclusive distribution are not able to 
equalize prices in the Union, the free movement of workers is unable to (if one would at all accept this 
as desirable) equalize wages in the Union.  
Wages and salaries remain higher in the center despite the fact there is a free movement of workers in 
the Union. So why do people from the periphery not just migrate and work in the center? Would 
Latvian workers find a job in Sweden if their Latvian employer had not been awarded a contract to 
perform works in Sweden, as in the case of Laval? Unless there is a deficit of a particular kind of 
workers in the center, workers from the periphery do not always easily compete with workers of the 
center, given the differences in language, education, and so on. There are large structural, formal, and 
informal barriers at play that prevent the movement of many workers, let alone the equalization of 
wages across the Union. “Parallel import“ of a cheaper workforce, if it happens at all, has little 
influence on the large disparity of wages or salaries in the Union. Migration of the workforce from the 
periphery can reduce wages in some isolated sectors, but this does not translate to a general 
equalization of wages across the Union. 
Bela Balassa notes that national restrictions to migration hinder the movement of labor, and that their 
elimination is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for achieving desirable labor movements. 
Migration is also hindered by various sociological, psychological, and economic obstacles. These are 
operative on the side of the migrants and on the side of the local population as well. Among the 
sociological and psychological factors restricting emigration are differences in language; customs; 
religion; climate; educational, medical and shopping facilities; cooking habits; and, in general, the loss 
of the accustomed environment. Economic factors include job and wage insecurity, loss of seniority, 
and inadequate housing facilities at the place of immigration.
169
       
The illustration of the effect of free movement of workers provisions on the equalization of wages is to 
further illustrate that perfect competition remains an elusive ideal and that there are numerous 
obstacles in the market unrelated to tariffs or to what is usual understood as a barrier. Competition 
law, by prohibiting exclusive distribution and allowing parallel imports, cannot create perfect equality 
of prices and thus cannot be understood as an excuse for allowing the practice of dumping on the 
internal market. In other words, the EU legal profession cannot absolve itself of the responsibility to 
protect the periphery from dumping by prohibiting limits on parallel imports and exclusive distribution 
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agreements, and even less so by the mistaken assumption that dumping is not possible on the internal 
market.  
The idea that there is a free market as a basis for parallel imports to equalize prices entails two false 
assumptions. Both assumptions build upon the error of the other. First, that there is such a thing as a 
free market without barriers. Second, that the European Union is already such a free market in which 
there is equal access to all and that everyone inhabits the same structural situation on the market. 
It thus should be obvious that there is more at play here than the obvious nonexistence of a “perfect” 
market in which all factors of production are completely free to move to the area where they are most 
valued.
170
 It is the very structural differences inherent in the EU that reproduce the price inequalities 
that have been my focus thus far (structural differences which the creators of the Euro, by no 
coincidence, failed to account for).
 171
 This is to say that the purportedly single market of the EU is in 
fact a highly differentiated and segmented market regulated by the consciousness of the “single 
market” as seen from the EU’s center. A “real” internal market free from barriers to trade is an 
illusion. The EU internal market is not a constant advancement of free movement considerations over 
social considerations, as EU lawyers from both political poles would like to see it. Rather, it is a 
complex set of entitlements allocated differently between different actors in the Union. In reality, the 
European Union internal market is, as any market, a single market in which some obstacles to some 
movements are sporadically reduced and some obstacles to some movements are added.
172
 The central 
question of analysis should thus be not whether a regime is or is becoming a freer trade regime or 
more akin to an internal market––a more private or a more public regime––but whose obstacles in the 
hierarchical structure are reduced and whose are increased.
173
  
Factors of production are themselves a phenomenon with a plethora of various emanations and 
regulation always affects them unequally. The legal system is a plethora of compromises which have a 
very specific effect on the movement of factors of production, but differently on different factors 
within each group of factors of production. These compromises result in entitlements which help some 
movements and deter others. Different capital, workers, goods or services are mobile differently as a 
result of the hierarchical structure of society. People have different legal entitlements depending on 
their place in the hierarchical structure of society. 
Arguments against dumping and against low pricing  
Some international trade scholars would contest the idea that dumping is at all harmful, which would 
also cast doubt on my own construction of dumping. The desirability of using antidumping duties and 
prohibiting price discrimination has been contested by some international trade law scholars
174
. The 
bedrock assumption of these scholars is that the companies engaged in dumping are behaving perfectly 
rationally by adapting their strategy to the demands of the particular markets.
175
 Allocative efficiency 
is achieved under perfect competition because producers, assuming they are acting rationally and have 
a desire to maximize profits, will expand their production for as long as it is privately profitable to do 
so. Economic theory teaches us that the appropriate price for a rational producer to charge is the price 
at which marginal revenue from the sale of a product is equal to its marginal cost, even though the 
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additional revenue does not cover the total cost of the product sold. This is why short-term, below-cost 
sales under such circumstances are viewed as rational and not viewed as predatory under antitrust 
laws. Below-cost sales in the short term are often deemed as rational if marginal costs do not exceed 
marginal revenues and should therefore not be controlled.
176
  
It is deemed rational that a company may wish to set prices above marginal cost to recover some fixed 
costs for those who are willing to pay more, while setting prices at or near marginal cost for those who 
can only afford to pay less to acquire the product or service in question. So if marginal costs are, say, 
ten percent of the list price, and there is a customer who is unwilling or unable to pay more than fifty 
percent of the list price for the product, it is in the interests of both the customer and the dominant 
company to grant the fifty-percent discount.
177
  
The dominant company receives a significant positive contribution to its revenues from the sale. The 
customer obtains a product, which he or she could not otherwise afford. Goods and services are 
allocated among consumers according to the price they are prepared to pay, and, in the long run, price 
equals the marginal cost. The transaction is economically rational and pro-competitive, and it would 
harm both consumers and producers to prohibit it. In other words, economists do not tend to view 
price discrimination with any particular suspicion, but think that its effects may be benign or at least 
not obviously anticompetitive.
178
 
The displacement of one competitor by another is not considered cause for concern according to 
international economic law and antitrust economic theory, assuming that the prevailing competitor’s 
behavior is not predatory. The argument is that if the price is not predatory, it should benefit from a 
very strong presumption of legality, since it will generally be pro-competitive and based on efficient 
market behavior. There is thus no reason to protect one set of competitors in preference to another set 
so long as competition in the market is not affected.
179
 An objection to this analysis could be that 
failure to prevent below-cost sales will allow a recession-bound economy to export recession to its 
trading partners. Nonetheless, William J. Davey argues that given the interdependence of economies, 
it seems fairest to let the strongest companies survive, wherever they are located, and to assist other 
competitors to adjust.
 180
  
Such thinking in economic theory resulted in a recent trend toward the normative maximization of 
costs (of the predator or of the dumping company) above which pricing is not perceived as 
predatory,
181
 or above which pricing is not perceived as dumping.
182
 According to this thinking, the 
lower the boundary of permitted low pricing, the more the consumer will benefit and the more welfare 
will be created. 
In this line, Mark Wu critiques the existing standards of dumping in international trade as inefficient 
and protectionist and argues for its change.
183
 According to Wu, instead of requiring evidence of price 
setting below average variable cost, international law currently only requires evidence of price setting 
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below the product’s “normal value,” a legally constructed term defined as “the comparable price, in 
the ordinary course of trade, for the like product.
184
 Most often, normal value equals the price charged 
by the foreign producer in its home market. In other words, under the existing standard, any firm that 
charges less for its product overseas than it does at home can be found guilty of dumping.
 185
 
Mark Wu further believes that firms that engage in this type of pricing strategy are behaving perfectly 
rationally. A firm may be making a strategic decision to earn less profit in an export market than its 
home market. This could be for a variety of reasons: the firm may not yet have an established 
reputation in another country, or it may be seeking a higher market share. The competitive structure of 
the firm’s home and export market may be different, or the firm may want exploit differences in the 
elasticity of demand across the countries. Provided that the firm is pricing above its average variable 
costs, its behavior should not be considered problematic, and according to economic theory, no 
remedy is necessary. Moreover, the net effect for the importing country is often positive, since 
consumers experience welfare gains from lower prices.
186
  
Thus, Wu argues, governments who are using antidumping measures for imports sold above the 
average variable cost are acting as protectionists––benefiting domestic producers at the expense of 
domestic consumers and foreign producers, without an economic justification for doing so.
187
 
“Rational,” non-predatory behavior should therefore not be punished.188 Hence, current antidumping 
laws are an economically inefficient and protectionist instrument, which harms global welfare and 
leads to unjust global consequences.
189
  
This trend of thinking about low prices is also present in antitrust law. Unless price-cutting is 
contained to the narrow scenarios of predatory pricing, it is considered among the most desirable of 
business activities. Einer Elhauge argues that the last thing of interest would be to enable firms to use 
antitrust law to discipline rival price cuts.
190
 
In the context of predatory pricing, Elhauge argues the benefit of lower prices and proposes an even 
lower boundary of permitted low pricing than Wu does. According to Elhauge, if the capital-intensive 
firm has increased output to displace its rival’s output, we should look only to the higher variable costs 
of the allegedly predatory increase in output, not to the lower variable costs of producing the 
predator’s entire output. Prices at or above those higher average variable costs cannot drive out a rival 
that is equally efficient at making that increment of output. If the capital-intensive firm’s variable costs 
of increasing its output enough to displace the rival are lower than the rival’s own variable costs of 
producing that output, then the rival is in fact not equally efficient at making its output. Rather, the 
rival’s output can more efficiently be supplied by an increase in the capital-intensive firm’s output, 
even though it may be exceeding the firm’s optimal capacity.191  
Reasoning in terms of the maximization of global welfare, in terms of maximization of the pie, follows 
the ideas of Ronald Coase, as well as of Calabresi and Melamed,
192
 in terms of the optimization of 
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social cost. Coase rejected the Pigouvian formulation of the problem in cases such factory’s smoke 
emissions that have harmful effects on those occupying neighboring properties. The economic analysis 
of such a situation has preceded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the 
factory, which resulted in either taxing the factory owner according to the damage the smoke caused, 
or making him or her liable to those injured by the smoke. According to Coase, these courses of action 
were inappropriate and led to the results which were not necessarily, or even usually, desirable.  
According to Coase, instead of attempting to somehow make the “private costs” faced by the factory 
owner match the “social cost” of his or her activity, the legal system should aim, in all cases of 
harmful effects, to maximize the value of production, taking into account the welfare and conduct of 
all affected parties.
193
 We should consider a wide variety of mechanisms by which harm might be 
mitigated or avoided. The goal should be to choose the solution that yields the least costs. That cannot 
be achieved on the basis of theory. Instead, it “has to come from a detailed investigation of the actual 
results of handling the problem in different ways.”194 
However, efficiency and social cost are evaluated in a particular manner by those who argue for the 
benefit of low pricing in dumping (as well as in predatory pricing). The social benefit and optimization 
are considered in terms of a cost and benefit to an abstract company and an abstract consumer, which 
misses the complexity of the hierarchical structure of society. The existing debate on dumping and 
predatory pricing practices revolves, as in the discussions surrounding Laval and Viking judgments, in 
terms of a universalized interplay of low prices and protectionism, in terms of the universalized 
interests of companies and consumers. As such, it does not give us a good sense of how antidumping 
law affects people’s welfare in the European Union, of people in diverse hierarchical situations in the 
legal structure.  
As the practice of goods dumping that I am describing is generally possible only by companies of the 
center and it affects consumers and companies of the periphery, abstract social welfare calculation in 
terms of an abstract producer and an abstract consumer is not sufficient to determine the desirability of 
the regulatory regime that is being constructed, and it leads to the mistaken perception of a desirability 
of low pricing.  
When following the argument of cost minimization,
195
 the social cost should not be constructed in the 
abstract. Rather, the question to be asked is––whose efficiency considerations are taken into account 
and whose claims of injury are being challenged? From whose perspective do we minimize costs? The 
choice we make should not be between economic efficiency and protectionism (sometimes referred to 
as equity or justice in contrast to efficiency); the choice is between different constructions of the legal 
system. In other words, instead of thinking in terms of a game between efficiency/low prices and 
protectionism, dumping and antitrust analysis should rather be made with a self-conscious awareness 
of one’s understanding of injury inflicted on people in diverse structural positions in society at any 
moment in time and the consequences the existing understanding of harm entail. In this approach, the 
starting point of normative economic analysis should be the hierarchical structure of society, not the 
minimization of social costs based on premises of assumptions of people’s equality and 
universalization.  
Davey has argued that unless we let the strongest companies survive and assist others to adjust, it 
would require supporting domestic producers’ government-protected entitlement to a certain market 
position.
196
 However, those who are allowed to harm other producers in the current regulatory setting 
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have a government-protected entitlement to a certain market position just as well. This becomes even 
more important when there is a structure at play enforcing who can inflict injury––when only 
companies of the center can profitably engage in the kind of dumping that I am describing. Generally, 
the lower the permitted low price in a dumping or predatory scenario is set, the greater the privilege of 
the companies of the center to harm companies of the periphery and become more efficient at their 
expense.   
Competition on the merits? 
There is no real “internal market” that one could aspire to construct197, just as there is no state of 
“perfect competition”198. Both are a matter of choice199 and construction which cannot rely on 
reductionist notions of consumer or producer welfare. No stage of economic integration or legal 
construction is inherently more public, more private, more protectionist in the abstract. The question is 
rather, who is protected by law in a particular structural situation. This also diverts the focus of 
international economic law inquiry away from considering borders and related measures as the main 
obstacle to trade. The dilemma of antitrust and trade law should not be understood as a choice between 
a consumer or total welfare standard or between efficiency and protectionism, but whose structural 
injury do we acknowledge and resist in legal and economic analysis.  
Companies in the center start from a position of dominance,
200
 which is further reinforced by the EU 
legal structure. The center companies’ cost structure is more efficient also because of the privilege to 
harm bestowed on them and withheld from periphery companies. A competitor from the periphery’s 
position differs because its ability to profitably engage in the dumping described is hindered, or even 
impossible. Dumping and price discrimination above average variable costs differently affects the cost 
structure of companies precisely because of their structural position as central or peripheral. Position 
enables economies of scale for companies of the center as a company’s variable costs and average 
variable costs decrease when a company is able to lower prices profitably. Low export prices generate 
further sales and improve economies of scale, which in turn lower the costs of production.   
On the other hand, dumping causes failing prices, declining sales, and increasing average variable 
costs of production for periphery companies. This prevents affecting companies from expanding and 
consequently, makes it more difficult for periphery competitors to enter the center’s markets.  
If government decides to set the price prohibited by competition law very low, this benchmark 
contributes to an upward cycle for companies from the center. If price discrimination and the 
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consequent low prices in the periphery are permitted, the bigger the upward spiral for companies from 
the center. The same upward spiral for companies from the center creates a symmetrical, but inverse, 
downward spiral for their competitors from the periphery. For companies on the periphery, price 
discrimination and internal dumping lead to higher costs, lower sales, stagnation, and possibly exit. 
Moreover, Wu’s conception of harm is exacted on a universalized notion of a consumer who buys 
products, not a consumer who simultaneously works to earn money to buy these products, and it does 
not take into account the fact that dumping might be performed selectively, as in the European Union. 
Wu’s reasoning gives, at least in the context of the EU legal structure, companies of the center benefit 
from a reinforced privilege to harm companies of the periphery, which in turn allows them to produce 
at even lower costs and harm companies of the periphery even more.  
The argument that when companies dump, they are only behaving “perfectly rationally”80 combined 
with a concern for administrability of the system
201
 thus cannot be a sufficient normative guide for the 
construction of the legal structure. It is by all means perfectly rational for firms to wish to expand and 
harm other firms. But this does not mean that we should yield to their particular interests and support 
an existing specific pattern of simultaneous expansion and destruction in our societies that is 
increasing welfare for some and decreasing the welfare of others. Wu’s normative guidance is that 
allowing low pricing coupled with an ex post facto “fairness” analysis is supposed to compensate for 
the possibility of methodological manipulations permitted for calculating “normal value” under 
existing law.
81
 But Wu’s normative analysis already has a particular normative twist; and, at least, in 
the context of dumping in EU law, it tends to harm the actors of the periphery.  
Likewise, we might consider Baker and Salop’s suggestion that regulatory agencies might forgo using 
scarce resources for matters where the bulk of harms are suffered by the rich. They cite luxury goods 
as an example, such as fine crystal products or yachts
202
, premium fountain pens, gem-quality 
diamonds, stock brokerage services, auctioning of high-end art, luxury automobiles, and skiing which 
are likely disproportionately used by the well-to-do.
203
 Yet, what does an unfettered privilege to injure 
of the corporations of the European center producing luxury goods mean for the development of 
industry capacities in the periphery and for the penetration of the luxury-products market of peripheral 
companies? What privileges to harm will remain unnoticed in such analysis of antitrust and trade?  
Thinking about consumers only as the spenders of money, not as workers or members of a particular 
community misses the daily dimensions of our lives and leads to misleading appreciation of welfare. 
Similarly, thinking about social dumping as a measure offering protection only to workers, also leads 
to a mistaken conclusion that social dumping harms workers and goods dumping harms companies. In 
reality, both doctrines harm both workers and companies. The question remains––which workers and 
which companies will be protected and which ones will be harmed by the legal system? Current legal 
and economic thinking tends to give preference to the interests of workers and companies of the 
center. 
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Conclusion 
The existing antitrust and international trade debate does not adequately address the complexity of the 
global hierarchical structure and thus the complexity of privileges to harm that contribute to the 
reproduction of existing hierarchies in our societies. Current debates, like that between Salop and 
Baker with Crane, show both overstated optimism that current antitrust thinking can capture reality, 
while contributing to intellectual paralysis, limiting the potential for social transformation. Thus, 
caution should be raised about current antitrust and trade law’s potential as a tool for either inequality 
or economic growth.  
Whose justice and growth is being constructed? There are different ways to structure "competition on 
the merits" and choices with countless alternatives are made in global antitrust and international trade 
governance. If social transformation is to be taken seriously, rather than resorting to an unquestioned 
understanding of maximization of global welfare or fairness, the hierarchical structure of society needs 
to be identified and addressed. This analysis casts doubt on the desirability of the existing normative 
bases of global antitrust law and anti-dumping law. It argues, among others, that the consumer welfare 
standard is incoherent and that low prices should necessarily be considered as beneficial. Yet it defies 
a conclusion that the object of resistance is economic theory or economic thinking.  
Crane’s distributional analysis shows the unpredictable, unforeseen and complex distributional 
consequences of lawmaking. Despite the complexity and difficulty of measuring the precise effects of 
our work, we can identify repetitive structures at play, structures that need to be articulated and 
addressed. “Dumping practices of the center” is a doctrine that addresses the privilege to harm that is 
missed both in economic analysis and in the debate about social justice and offers one analysis and 
explanation for the reproduction of hierarchies and concentration of power, wealth, knowledge, 
authority and prestige in the center of the European Union, despite the EU's promise of equal 
economic development for all. Unless such hidden hierarchies and injuries are identified, there is no 
potential for remedying them, neither by the tax and transfer regime nor by the legal system.  
But it is not only the European Union that is hierarchically structured. Global society is a hierarchical 
structure, granting different opportunities to people in diverse positions in the hierarchical structure to 
injure others. Hierarchies cannot be alleviated, but they can be reversed and reconstructed.
204
 The 
construction of dumping on the EU internal market is situated in a particular time and place, but it is 
an example of an analysis of the global hierarchical structure that I would propose for the future 
exploration of challenging the concentration of wealth, power, knowledge, authority and prestige 
globally.  
Paul Krugman’s205 and Anthony Atkinson’s206 claim that monopoly and anticompetitive market 
conditions are among the root causes of wealth inequality is based on a mistaken understanding of 
global governance. Antitrust enforcement accounts for a tiny fraction of global governance. No field 
of law alone can capture the complexity or the magnitude of the global hierarchical struggle and of the 
reproduction of existing hierarchies in the world. The phenomenon is far larger and each of us is 
implicated in it in every moment.
207
 Yet, the tools of antitrust and trade analysis can aid in the 
articulation of resistance to the existing hierarchical structure. 
Reproduction of hierarchies is due to our constant bringing of the past into the present. In other words, 
the hierarchies and injuries of the past moment that remain unchallenged are the law of today.
208
 
                                                     
204 Id.  
205 Paul Krugman, Robots and Robber Barons (2012), available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/opinion/krugman-
robots-and-robber-barons.html?_r=0. 
206 Anthony B. Atkinson, Inequality: What can be done? 126-127 (2015). 
207 Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 17, at 192.  
208 See id at 159. See also Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 40, at 412.  
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Lawyers are constantly governing the world as any other person, but we have the analytical tools to 
articulate these countless injuries and challenge them. 
 
  
 
